1. In my country, there are media organizations that belong to the World Chinese Media (世界华文媒体) network. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 1 2. In my country, there are journalists or media organizations which are members of the Belt and Road Media Cooperation Alliance/Union, the Belt and Road News Alliance, or other Belt and Road media networks that connected to PRC (e.g. Belt and Road Media Community, Belt and Road Journalists Network, Belt and Road News Network, or B\&R TV Networks). ExposureGraded 0–4No. 2 Additional remark For members of Belt and Road Media Community (BRMC), local respondents can check the following link: [http://brmc.chnpec.com/en/member.shtml](http://brmc.chnpec.com/en/member.shtml) For members of B\&R TV Networks, local respondents can check the following link: [http://en.videochina.org.cn/2017/0417/4741.shtml](http://en.videochina.org.cn/2017/0417/4741.shtml) For committee of Belt and Road News Network (BRNN), local respondents can check the following link: [http://cn.brnn.com/414904/414908/index.html](http://cn.brnn.com/414904/414908/index.html) 3. In my country, there are journalists, media organizations or online influencers who have attended all-expenses paid media tours in PRC. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 3 4. In my country, there are journalists, media organizations or online influencers who have received trainings from PRC state-owned media or PRC-connected entities. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 4 Additional remark This Indicator measures whether there are local media personalities or personnel from local media organizations being trained by PRC state-owned media or PRC-connected entities. Journalists who are hired by PRC media are therefore not part of this category. 5. In my country, PRC state-media (including print, radio, and video) is broadcasted or distributed in a local language. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 5 6. In my country, there are local media outlets wholly or partly owned by PRC citizens or corporations. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 6 7. In my country, there are media outlets that have delivered cheap or free contents provided by PRC state-fund media. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 7 Additional remark This Indicator measures whether local media outlets broadcast news, video clips, or other contents provided by PRC state-fund media. The phenomenon can be observed via footages of content pieces. Therefore, press statement from PRC governmental agencies do not fall into the category of contents provided by PRC state-fund media. 8. In my country, there are regular PRC state-media or government advertisements inserted within local newspapers, online news websites or social media. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 8 9. In my country, there are journalists who have had pressure exerted on them by the PRC, including (but not limited to) public denouncement, revocation of journalist ID, denial of visa. PressureYes / NoNo. 9 10. In my country, there are incidents of media outlets censoring views critical of the PRC government. EffectGraded 0–4No. 10 11. In my country, there are media personalities (including reporters, journalists or commentators) or celebrities who deny the existence of human rights abuses in the PRC (e.g. a media personality that doubts there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang). EffectGraded 0–4No. 11

1. My country’s legislature has a joint parliamentary friendship group, committee or other forms of sub-organizations with PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 12 Additional remark Although in some countries, parliamentary structure does not allow for such groups or committees, we still consider this Indicator as important. "Joint parliamentary friendship group" means joint as PRC and target country representatives. 2. Representatives of a political party in my country’s national legislature have met officially with representatives of the PRC. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 13 3. The PRC provides training to diplomats or civil servants on governance from my country (such as at 国家行政学院 or 中央党校). PressureGraded 0–4No. 14 4. In my country, politicians or government employees have been pressured by PRC diplomats to change their political or diplomatic stances. PressureGraded 0–4No. 15 5. Citizens of my country have been detained in PRC or denied exit visas, and believed to be suffering from unfair legal treatments for political reasons, a.k.a. “hostage diplomacy”. PressureYes / NoNo. 16 6. The head of state, head of government or foreign minister of my country has denied Taiwan’s right to participation as a member, observer or guest in WHO. EffectYes / NoNo. 17 Additional remark The information is disclosed in the summary and verbatim records of WHO: [https://apps.who.int/gb/or/](https://apps.who.int/gb/or/) (Please check the latest records of World Health Assembly, WHA series) 7. My country publicly supported the appointment of a PRC official to be the head of a United Nations agency (such as the FAO or ICAO) or other intergovernmental organizations (such as INTERPOL). EffectGraded 0–4No. 18 8. My government has shown support of PRC's territorial claims (such as on the South China Sea arbitration ruling issued by the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal in July 2016; except claims over Taiwan, which are indirectly covered in Indicator 6.) EffectPosition 0 / 2 / 4No. 19 0 = My country has rejected PRC’s claim; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has adhered to PRC’s claim 9. My country has shown one of the following stances on PRC’s treatment of its Uyghur population. EffectPosition 0 / 2 / 4No. 20 0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance 10. My country has shown one of the following stances on PRC’s treatment of its Tibet population. EffectPosition 0 / 2 / 4No. 21 0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance 11. My government has not publicly criticized the PRC’s imposition of the National Security Law on Hong Kong. EffectPosition 0 / 2 / 4No. 22 0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance

1. In my country, universities have established research partnerships with PRC-connected entities. (e.g. Huawei, Tencent or Alibaba) ExposureGraded 0–4No. 23 2. In my country, there are Confucius Institutes/Classrooms. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant). ExposureNo. 24 3. My country plans to include, or does include, Chinese as a foreign language in K12 or primary education, and receives free or subsidized (e.g. offered below market price) educational books and teachers from PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 25 4. In my country, one or more think tanks and academic research centers belong to PRC-affiliated networks/associations (such as: the Silk Road Think Tank Association, Silk Road Think Tank Network \[SiLKS], Belt and Road Studies Network, University Alliance of the Silk Road, University Consortium of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). ExposureGraded 0–4No. 26 Additional remark For member of SiLKS, local respondents can check the following link: [http://www.esilks.org/about/members](http://www.esilks.org/about/members) For members of Belt and Road Studies Network, local respondents can check the following link: [http://www.brsn.net/list/zhikujigou\_en/index.html](http://www.brsn.net/list/zhikujigou_en/index.html) For members of University Consortium of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, local respondents can check the following link: [http://www.ucmsr.com/route](http://www.ucmsr.com/route) 5. In my country, think tanks and academic research centers have received financial support from PRC-connected individuals or entities. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 27 6. In my country, experts participate in PRC talent recruitment programs such as the Thousand Talents Program or Changjiang Scholars program. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 28 7. In my country, scholars have taken trips to the PRC paid for by PRC-connected individuals or entities. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 29 Additional remark PRC-connected individuals or entities can pay trips for scholars within Index countries by providing scholarships. However, this Indicator is to measure whether the paid trip is part of PRC influence operations targeting the intellectual community within Index countries. Following cases are incidents described by this Indicator: [https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/communist-chinas-influence-operations-indias-think-tanks-politicians-intellectuals-academia-media-targets](https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/communist-chinas-influence-operations-indias-think-tanks-politicians-intellectuals-academia-media-targets) 8. In my country, organized PRC-connected student groups, such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), are involved in attempts to censor staff or students (e.g. by harassing students protesting human rights abuses in the PRC, or formally complaining about the identification of Taiwan as a country in lecture slides). PressureGraded 0–4No. 30 9. In my country, scholars or academics have been denied visas to travel to the PRC after expressing opinions or producing scholarship that is critical of the PRC. PressureGraded 0–4No. 31 10. In my country, PRC-connected entities have been involved in school or university curriculum design, such as courses about East Asian history, modern politics, etc. EffectYes / NoNo. 32 11. In my country, there are confirmed reports of teachers or professors avoiding the discussion of sensitive political issues (e.g. Uyghur re-education camps, Taiwan independence, Tiananmen Square Massacre). EffectGraded 0–4No. 33

1. In my country, politicians or government employees at the sub-national level are signing agreements with the PRC government or state owned enterprises. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 34 Additional remark This Indicator is to measure the sub-national or city level partnership, if an agreement is signed at the national level on behalf of the local government, the answer to this Indicator should be positive. 2. In my country, local municipalities have sister-city ties (友好城市) with municipalities in the PRC. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 35 3. In my country, politicians or government employees have taken trips to the PRC paid for by PRC-connected individuals or entities. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 36 Additional remark This Indicator is to measure whether the paid trip is part of PRC influence operations targeting politicians and governmental employees within Index countries. Following cases are incidents described by this Indicator: [https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/communist-chinas-influence-operations-indias-think-tanks-politicians-intellectuals-academia-media-targets](https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/communist-chinas-influence-operations-indias-think-tanks-politicians-intellectuals-academia-media-targets) & [https://amp.abc.net.au/article/9907064](https://amp.abc.net.au/article/9907064) 4. In my country, politicians or government employees visit the PRC and have meetings with PRC officials and think tanks. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 37 5. In my country, law enforcement and judicial related training offered by PRC-connected individuals or entities has been accepted by national or subnational governments. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 38 6. In my country, there are reports of politicians or political parties receiving campaign donations that originate in the PRC. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 39 7. In my country, groups with reported links to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) have hosted fundraisings or have provided other forms of support for government employees, politicians or parties. PressureGraded 0–4No. 40 8. In my country, groups with reported links to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) have made public statements opposing the candidacy of a local political candidate or party, claiming them being “anti-China”. PressureGraded 0–4No. 41 9. In my country, politicians or government employees have publicly expressed positive views of the PRC government. EffectGraded 0–4No. 42 10. In my country, politicians or government employees have received direct or deferred benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities openly or covertly (e.g. have been appointed to lucrative positions as board members or consultants with PRC-invested firms, casinos, energy companies, etc.) during or in retirement from public office. EffectGraded 0–4No. 43 11. In my country, security services (安保/保安) offered by private PRC companies are contracted by national or subnational governments. EffectGraded 0–4No. 44 Additional remark This Indicator is to measure whether security service is provided by PRC companies. If there is only hardware purchased from PRC companies, it is not incident described in the Indicator.

1. The PRC is my country's number one trading partner (for trade in goods only). ExposureYes / NoNo. 45 2. PRC-connected entities own more than 50% of my country’s sovereign debt. ExposureYes / NoNo. 46 Additional remark In the report "Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects", hidden debt exposure of some countries to PRC is revealed. You can download the full publication in the following link: [https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road](https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road) 3. The PRC is the top customer for my country’s extractive industries. ExposureYes / NoNo. 47 Additional remark We do not include "agroindustry with transgenic seed" in the definition of extractive industries. We consider extractive industries as different activities that lead to the extraction of raw materials from the earth (such as oil, metals, minerals and aggregates). 4. In my country, PRC-related entities own, operate or substantially control critical infrastructure (e.g. ports, power plants, digital data centers, etc) or sensitive sectors (biotech, raw materials, etc.) ExposureYes / NoNo. 48 Additional remark Both in the report "Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects" (download full publication here at: [https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road](https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road) ) and on the "The People's Map of Global China" website (visit the visualized world map of PRC-connected investments: [https://thepeoplesmap.net/](https://thepeoplesmap.net/) ) disclose the infrastructures related to the PRC government and PRC-connected entities. 5. My country joined (or applied to join) the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). ExposureYes / NoNo. 49 6. In my country, major businesses are members of the Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce, or of the Belt and Road Industrial and Commercial Alliance, or of the Belt and Road General Chamber of Commerce. ExposureYes / NoNo. 50 7. My country has been the target of PRC economic coercion (e.g. trade or investment sanctions) that was specifically tailored at products or services that are highly dependent on the PRC market. PressureYes / NoNo. 51 8. In my country, local businesses have been harassed, threatened, or boycotted, due to their activities or statements in support of causes deemed unacceptable by the PRC government (e.g. Taiwanese independence, Hong Kong democracy, Tibet or Xinjiang issues, etc). PressureYes / NoNo. 52 9. My country has free-trade agreement(s) with the PRC (either bilateral or as part of regional agreement(s)) that primarily deals with trade in goods or services, including digital goods or services. EffectYes / NoNo. 53 10. In my country, central or local governments have relaxed or removed regulatory restrictions, or have established special economic zones (or free trade zones, industrial parks, etc.) to attract investments or economic participation from the PRC. EffectYes / NoNo. 54 Additional remark If the country only has intention to build special economic zones to attract investment from the PRC and not yet formalize, the answer to this Indicator remains "NO". We can update the answer next year to see how it changes. But it will be great to put supplementary notes to further indicate the situation in the country. 11. In my country, PRC-connected entities requisitioned infrastructure or land for failure to repay debts in a timely manner. EffectYes / NoNo. 55

1. In my country, PRC-connected entities (such as China Mobile, China Unicom or China Telecom) or their subsidiaries provide telecom services. ExposureYes / NoNo. 56 2. In my country, telecoms have signed agreements to adopt hardwares or technical specifications of 4G or 5G cellular networks that are produced or developed by Huawei, ZTE or other PRC enterprises. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 57 3. In my country, telecoms have adopted hardware or technical specifications by PRC-connected entities in internet/wifi/telecommunication service infrastructure projects, in addition to 4G/5G cellular network. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 58 Additional remark If telecoms in the country have purchased hardwares such as routers, switches, server clusters or other devices (such as the “middleboxes” mentioned in the following link: [https://www.top10vpn.com/research/huawei-china-surveillance-state/?fbclid=iwar047govzg6aqbparxz\_zyxex35a13xejedk\_zcziaasaxatlbd0bhzz2j8](https://www.top10vpn.com/research/huawei-china-surveillance-state/?fbclid=iwar047govzg6aqbparxz_zyxex35a13xejedk_zcziaasaxatlbd0bhzz2j8), which are used to monitor internet traffics and to block certain contents) to serve the purposes of providing internet access, ensuring quality of service (QoS), routing and monitoring internet traffics, collecting and censoring certain contents, or other actions that access, capture or alter the information flows on the network, then the answer of the Indicator shall be “1–4” (i.e. not 0), depending on the scale of the telecoms, the nature of the hardware adoptions and the real impacts of such adoption. It shall also be noted that, while some countries have regulations that prohibit further procurement of such devices, telecoms may not always follow the rules, or they're currently phasing out such devices and the process is not yet completed, e.g. rural/small-scale telecoms in the U.S.; in these cases, the answer shall still be "1–4" (i.e. not 0), with a brief explanation on the supplementary note to elaborate the current status, if feasible. 4. In my country, PRC-connected entities are authorized vendors to supply tech related equipment or services to our government, military or security services. ExposureYes / NoNo. 59 Additional remark On the "Mapping China's Tech Giant's" website, the track of the expansion of key Chinese technology companies is shown. You may visit the website here at: [https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage/](https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage/) to acquire data described in the Indicator. 5. In my country, central or local governments have collaboration (such as data collection or exchange agreement, or adoption of related hardwares) with PRC government or PRC-connected entities on facial, voice recognition or other applications involving biometrics achieved by AI. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 60 6. In my country, one or more cities have procured, or have signed contracts with PRC-connected entities to establish “smart city” systems. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 61 Additional remark On the "Mapping China's Tech Giant's" website, the track of the expansion of key Chinese technology companies is shown. You may visit the website here at: [https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage/](https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage/) to acquire data described in the Indicator. 7. In my country, financial institutions use the China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) clearing and settlement services system. ExposureYes / NoNo. 62 Additional remark For the global service of CIPS, local respondents can check the following link to find out whether the service exists within Index countries: [https://www.cips.com.cn/](https://www.cips.com.cn/) Please note that the information is only shown on the Simplified Chinese version website. 8. In my country, PRC-connected venture capital invests in technology start-ups. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 63 9. In my country, companies have publicly announced that they had signed MOUs to collaborate on technological development (such as collaborations in A.I., Blockchain, Cloud Computing, Big Data) with PRC-connected entities. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 64 10. In my country, PRC-connected entities are shareholders or developers of the top five popular social media/messaging apps, based on usage. ExposureYes / NoNo. 65 Additional remark This Indicator measures the "usage" of the apps instead of download numbers. However, if the respondent is certain about the usage but can't manage to find public data, then download numbers can be used as supporting evidence. For download number, local respondents can check the following link: [https://sensortower.com/android/rankings/top/mobile/cambodia/overall?locale=zh-CN\&iap=all\&watch\_enabled\&rankings\_type=free\&min\_cost=0\&max\_cost\&date=2021-06-12\&show\_store\_dat=true](https://sensortower.com/android/rankings/top/mobile/cambodia/overall?locale=zh-CN\&iap=all\&watch_enabled\&rankings_type=free\&min_cost=0\&max_cost\&date=2021-06-12\&show_store_dat=true) 11. In my country, the central or local government(s) has collaborated with the PRC on endorsing the use of Beidou satellite navigation system. ExposureYes / NoNo. 66 Additional remark If there is ongoing discussion of Beidou satellite navigation system with no closed contract, the answer remains "NO". We can update the answer next year to see how it changes. But it will be great to put supplementary notes to further indicate the situation in the country. For international collaborations, local respondents can check the following link: [http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/gjhz/index.html](http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/gjhz/index.html) Please note that the information is only shown on the Simplified Chinese version website.

1. In my country, there are local groups or organizations with words like “Promotion of Peaceful Reunification” in their name, and they regularly publicize their views on Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang issues. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 67 Additional remark Local respondents may check the following link to find out whether there are activities affiliated to "Promotion of Peaceful Reunification" within Index countries: [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtchdt/](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtchdt/) 2. In my country, there are members and member organizations of United World Chinese Association (世界华人协会). ExposureYes / NoNo. 68 Additional remark Local respondents may check the following link to find out whether there are incidents described in this Indicator: [http://www.uwca.net/member.html](http://www.uwca.net/member.html) by identifying members or member organizations within Index countries. 3. In my country, labour unions cooperate on exchanges or official visits to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in the PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 69 4. In my country, there are local reports of personnel linked to the UFWD who make appearances at Chinese diaspora community events and activities (e.g. Lunar New Year events, Dragon Boat festival tournaments, etc). ExposureGraded 0–4No. 70 5. In my country, there are PRC-connected professional associations that are closely engaged with their counterparts locally, such as All-China Journalists Association (中华全国新闻工作者协会), China Artists Association (中国艺术家协会), China Writers Association (中国作家协会) or All-China Women Federation (全国妇联). ExposureGraded 0–4No. 71 Additional remark This Indicator is to measure exchanged activities that are related to PRC-connected professional associations. People-to-people exchanges without associations being involved are thus not incidents described in this Indicator. 6. In my country, PRC-connected individuals or entities donate money or provide other types of support to religious communities and charities. ExposureYes / NoNo. 72 7. In my country, PRC government or PRC-connected entities distribute entertainment products (including: drama and TV shows) or related hardwares (e.g. OTT streaming players hosting PRC media channels) freely or at a cheap price. ExposureGraded 0–4No. 73 8. Cultural products (such as films and TV shows) produced by my country’s production studios typically portray the PRC in a positive light. EffectYes / NoNo. 74 9. In my country, celebrities regularly publish or share propaganda narratives from the PRC. EffectGraded 0–4No. 75 10. In my country, the national or local governments regularly publish or share propaganda narratives from the PRC (e.g. statements from the PRC government or embassies). EffectGraded 0–4No. 76 11. In my country, a majority of citizens have positive views of the PRC government. EffectYes / NoNo. 77

1. My country currently imports (or receives in-kind donation of) military or law-enforcement equipment or components of equipment from the PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 78 2. My country currently exports military or law-enforcement equipment or components of equipment to the PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 79 3. My country co-develops or co-produces military or law-enforcement equipment with the PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 80 Additional remark If the country has received any in-kind donation (military or law-enforcement equipment) from the PRC, the answer to this Indicator should also be "YES". But it will be great to put supplementary notes to further indicate the situation in the country. We will consider adding another Indicator to measure donations in money format from the PRC. 4. In my country, there are reports that the PRC has expressed intentions or has taken actions to establish basing. ExposureYes / NoNo. 81 5. In my country, the PLA has participated in a humanitarian relief/disaster assistance (HADR) effort. ExposureYes / NoNo. 82 Additional remark If there are vaccine donations or other forms of donations from PRC in the country, the answer can be "YES" when these donations are related to the PLA after investigation. 6. In my country, PLA military personnel are permanently or rotationally deployed (excluding defense attaches and peacekeepers). ExposureYes / NoNo. 83 7. In my country, members of the military have received professional military education from the PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 84 8. In my country, members of the military have received peacekeeping training from the PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 85 9. In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officers have received direct or deferred benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities openly or covertly (e.g. have been appointed to lucrative positions as board members or consultants with PRC-invested firms, casinos, energy companies, etc.) during or in retirement from public service. ExposureYes / NoNo. 86 10. In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officials advocate for more coordination with the PLA. EffectYes / NoNo. 87 11. My country cooperates with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on military exchange exercises, including drills and war games. EffectYes / NoNo. 88

1. My country currently maintains an extradition treaty, legal mutual assistance or other similar arrangements with the PRC. ExposureYes / NoNo. 89 2. In my country, law enforcement authorities have signed cooperation agreements with the PRC on combatting terrorism. ExposureYes / NoNo. 90 3. In my country, PRC connected gangs (such as Triad, 三合会) are known to be operating in my country YES/NO. ExposureNo. 91 4. In my country, there are reports of economic espionage targeting the private sector that were suspected to benefit PRC-connected entities. PressureGraded 0–4No. 92 Additional remark In this Indicator, we try to see whether there is economic espionage targeting the private sector. The act of attacking the governmental agencies responds to the Indicator Law enforcement-5. An example of economic espionage described in the Indicator: [https://www.wired.com/story/us-hits-huawei-new-charges-trade-secret-theft/](https://www.wired.com/story/us-hits-huawei-new-charges-trade-secret-theft/) 5. In my country, there are reports of cyber attacks targeting government, critical infrastructure, or enterprises, that were suspected to be initiated from the PRC. PressureGraded 0–4No. 93 6. In my country, triads are known to have threatened or used violence to coerce, intimidate or punish Chinese dissidents. PressureGraded 0–4No. 94 7. My country has deployed video or internet surveillance systems from the PRC for law enforcement. EffectYes / NoNo. 95 8. In my country, representatives of the PRC police force have had joint patrols with local law enforcement. EffectYes / NoNo. 96 Additional remark If the country only has intention to have joint patrols with the PRC police, the answer to this Indicator remains "NO". We can update the answer next year to see how it changes. But it will be great to put supplementary notes to further indicate the situation in the country. 9. My government has detained people at the request of the PRC for committing a crime involving engagements with social movements or resistance activities in Hong Kong, Xinjiang or for other human rights or civic rights issues. EffectYes / NoNo. 97 10. My country has deported Taiwan citizens to the PRC to face prosecution. EffectYes / NoNo. 98 11. My country has extradited or has deported individuals to the PRC, although such decisions had attracted criticisms from politicians, government employees or from local or foreign NGOs. EffectYes / NoNo. 99