> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://methodology.china-index.io/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
# Indicator changes
> How the 2024 Indicators relate to the 2022 Indicators, one Indicator at a time.
An Indicator score can be read alongside its 2022 counterpart only where the scope and grading are unchanged. Broadened, merged and moved Indicators measure something different from 2022.
## 2022 → 2024
| Change | Indicators | Scope compared with 2022 |
| - | - | - |
| Equivalent | 36 | Unchanged |
| Reworded | 23 | Unchanged (grading changed for 3) |
| Broadened | 13 | Broadened |
| Merged | 4 | Broadened, from two 2022 Indicators |
| Moved | 7 | Domain or Layer changed |
| New | 16 | — |
| Retired (2022 only) | 12 | — |
The 2024 edition has 99 Indicators. The comparison was reviewed on 2026-09-27.
### New Indicators
Indicators added in 2024 with no 2022 counterpart.
| 2024 Indicator | Text |
| - | - |
| Media 10 (#10) | In my country, there are media organizations that describe relations with the PRC as based on friendship, brotherhood, or otherwise use emotive language that refers to the relationship in familial terms. |
| Foreign Policy 2 (#13) | My country receives foreign aid or significant in-kind donations from the PRC. |
| Foreign Policy 5 (#16) | In my country, politicians or government officials participate in events or projects affiliated with the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED, 中国环境与发展国际合作委员会). |
| Foreign Policy 6 (#17) | My country has signed an agreement with the PRC to classify their diplomatic relationship as a "Strategic Partnership" or beyond. |
| Foreign Policy 7 (#18) | My country unquestionably uses PRC’s "One China Principle" which articulates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, rather than my country's own "One China Policy." |
| Academia 11 (#33) | In my country, scholars have published articles that echo PRC talking points, such as denying the existence of or whitewashing human rights abuses (e.g. an academic who rejects that there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang). |
| Domestic Politics 8 (#41) | PRC officials or PRC state media have criticized, harassed, or threatened local politicians, local government officials, or political parties in my country due to their activities, statements or policy advocacy. |
| Domestic Politics 11 (#44) | In my country, officials, political parties, and political elites try to suppress criticism of the PRC. |
| Economy 2 (#46) | PRC-connected entities own more than 25% of my country’s bilateral sovereign debt. |
| Technology 7 (#62) | My country is directly served by a subsea or land-based major fiber optic internet cable built by a PRC-connected entity, or has greenlit plans for one to be built in the future. |
| Technology 10 (#65) | My country has signed space cooperation agreements or memorandums of understanding, or formed space cooperation mechanisms with PRC-connected entities. |
| Society 9 (#75) | In my country, there are cultural events, cultural exchange projects, or cultural organizations that are funded by or receive funding from PRC-connected entities, including in sports. |
| Society 10 (#76) | In my country, gamers, gaming communities, or game developers/publishers have been involved in freedom of speech controversies related to the PRC. |
| Military 2 (#79) | My country’s government has participated in one or more multilateral security dialogues organized by the PRC (e.g. China-Africa Peace and Security Forum; the Conference on Interaction & Confidence Building Measures in Asia). |
| Military 8 (#85) | In my country, senior military or civilian defense leaders have participated in bilateral meetings with PLA officers at or above the one-star rank. |
| Law Enforcement 8 (#96) | In my country, PRC-connected individuals or entities have established extra-legal physical premises from which to surveil or detain members of the Chinese diaspora (e.g. overseas police service stations). |
### Merged Indicators
Two 2022 Indicators combined into one, usually with a broader scope.
**2024:** In my country, politicians or government employees have publicly echoed PRC talking points (e.g. denying PRC human rights issues, arguing that the PRC’s one-party political system could be beneficial for my country’s economic growth).
**2022 Domestic Politics 9 (#42):** In my country, politicians or government employees have publicly expressed positive views of the PRC government.
**2022 Society 10 (#76):** In my country, the national or local governments regularly publish or share propaganda narratives from the PRC (e.g. statements from the PRC government or embassies).
*Combines 2022 Domestic Politics 9 and Society 10 and broadens the scope.*
**2024:** My country has been the target of PRC economic coercion (e.g. trade/investment sanctions, boycotts) after the government, private companies, or NGOs made statements or introduced policies deemed unfavorable to the PRC.
**2022 Economy 8 (#52):** In my country, local businesses have been harassed, threatened, or boycotted, due to their activities or statements in support of causes deemed unacceptable by the PRC government (e.g. Taiwanese independence, Hong Kong democracy, Tibet or Xinjiang issues, etc).
**2022 Economy 7 (#51):** My country has been the target of PRC economic coercion (e.g. trade or investment sanctions) that was specifically tailored at products or services that are highly dependent on the PRC market.
*Combines 2022 Economy 7 and Economy 8 and broadens the scope.*
**2024:** In my country, military professionals have participated in military education or training programs provided by the PRC.
**2022 Military 7 (#84):** In my country, members of the military have received professional military education from the PRC.
**2022 Military 8 (#85):** In my country, members of the military have received peacekeeping training from the PRC.
*Combines 2022 Military 7 and Military 8 and broadens the scope.*
**2024:** My country has extradited or deported individuals to the PRC despite criticism from politicians, government employees, or NGOs.
**2022 Law Enforcement 10 (#98):** My country has deported Taiwan citizens to the PRC to face prosecution.
**2022 Law Enforcement 11 (#99):** My country has extradited or has deported individuals to the PRC, although such decisions had attracted criticisms from politicians, government employees or from local or foreign NGOs.
*Combines 2022 Law Enforcement 10 and Law Enforcement 11 and broadens the scope.*
### Moved Indicators
Indicators that changed Domain, Layer or position.
**2024:** Representatives of a political party in my country’s national legislature have been invited to visit the PRC or attended events hosted by the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party (中共中央对外联络部), including World Political Parties Summits, CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meetings, BRICS Political Parties Dialogues, Think Tanks and Civil Society Organizations Fora, etc.
**2022 Foreign Policy 2 (#13):** Representatives of a political party in my country‘s national legislature have met officially with representatives of the PRC.
*Moved from Foreign Policy to Domestic Politics.*
**2024:** In my country, financial institutions use the China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) clearing and settlement services system.
**2022 Technology 7 (#62):** In my country, financial institutions use the China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) clearing and settlement services system.
*Moved from Technology to Economy.*
**2024:** In my country, PRC-connected entities are the main shareholders or developers of the top five popular social media/messaging apps, based on their usage.
**2022 Technology 10 (#65):** In my country, PRC-connected entities are shareholders or developers of the top five popular social media/messaging apps, based on usage.
*Moved from Technology to Society.*
**2024:** In my country, security services (安保/保安) offered by private PRC companies are contracted by national or subnational governments.
**2022 Domestic Politics 11 (#44):** In my country, security services (安保/保安) offered by private PRC companies are contracted by national or subnational governments.
*Moved from Domestic Politics to Law Enforcement.*
**2024:** In my country, law enforcement and judicial-related training offered by PRC-connected individuals or entities have been accepted by national or subnational governments.
**2022 Domestic Politics 5 (#38):** In my country, law enforcement and judicial related training offered the PRC-connected individuals or entities has been accepted by national or subnational governments.
*Moved from Domestic Politics to Law Enforcement.*
**2024:** In my country, there are reports of cyber attacks targeting government, critical infrastructure, or enterprises that were suspected to be initiated from the PRC.
**2022 Law Enforcement 5 (#93):** In my country, there are reports of cyber attacks targeting government, critical infrastructure, or enterprises that were suspected to be initiated from the PRC.
*Moved to a new position in 2024. Grading also changed.*
**2024:** My country has deployed video or internet surveillance systems from the PRC for law enforcement.
**2022 Law Enforcement 7 (#95):** My country has deployed video or internet surveillance systems from the PRC for law enforcement.
*Moved from Effect to Alignment within Law Enforcement.*
### Broadened Indicators
Same subject, wider scope than the 2022 wording.
**2024:** In my country, journalists, media organizations, or online influencers have participated in international travel organized by PRC state-owned media or PRC-connected entities.
**2022 Media 3 (#3):** In my country, there are journalists, media organizations or online influencers who have attended all-expenses paid media tours in PRC.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, there are local media outlets wholly or majority owned by PRC-connected individuals or entities, or media owners who have significant business interests in the PRC.
**2022 Media 6 (#6):** In my country, there are local media outlets wholly or partly owned by PRC citizens or corporations.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, media outlets have delivered content provided by PRC state-funded media, or under content-sharing agreements with PRC state-funded media.
**2022 Media 7 (#7):** In my country, there are media outlets that have delivered cheap or free contents provided by PRC state-fund media.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, there are media personalities (including reporters, journalists or commentators) or celebrities who echo PRC talking points, such as denying the existence of or whitewashing human rights abuses (e.g. a media personality who rejects that there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang).
**2022 Media 11 (#11):** In my country, there are media personalities (including reporters, journalists or commentators) or celebrities who deny the existence of human rights abuses in the PRC (e.g. a media personality that doubts there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang).
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, scholars have taken trips to the PRC or to other countries organized or run by PRC-connected individuals or entities.
**2022 Academia 7 (#29):** In my country, scholars have taken trips to the PRC paid for by PRC-connected individuals or entities.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, scholars or academics have been pressured after expressing opinions or producing scholarship that is critical of the PRC, including via visa denials for PRC travel, workplace censure, lawsuits, legal challenges, or threats thereof.
**2022 Academia 9 (#31):** In my country, scholars or academics have been denied visas to travel to the PRC after expressing opinions or producing scholarship that is critical of the PRC.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, local municipalities or provinces have sister-city or sister-province ties (友好城市) with municipalities or provinces in the PRC.
**2022 Domestic Politics 2 (#35):** In my country, local municipalities have sister-city ties (友好城市) with municipalities in the PRC.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, PRC-connected entities are authorized to supply tech-related equipment for critical infrastructure (such as airports, public transport, government IT networks, ports etc.).
**2022 Technology 4 (#59):** In my country, PRC-connected entities are authorized vendors to supply tech-related equipment or services to our government, military or security services.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, PRC-affiliated venture capital, financial firms or PRC government entities invest in local technology start-ups.
**2022 Technology 8 (#63):** In my country, PRC-connected venture capital invests in technology start-ups.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** My country co-develops or co-produces military or law-enforcement equipment with the PRC (including arrangements where PLA-affiliated professionals work in domestic labs researching dual-use technologies).
**2022 Military 3 (#80):** My country co-develops or co-produces military or law-enforcement equipment with the PRC.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officials publicly advocate for friendly foreign policy or military cooperation with the PRC.
**2022 Military 10 (#87):** In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officials advocate for more coordination with the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA).
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** In my country, organized local criminal groups are known to have threatened or used violence to coerce, intimidate, or punish individuals critical of the PRC.
**2022 Law Enforcement 6 (#94):** In my country, triads are known to have threatened or used violence to coerce, intimidate or punish Chinese dissidents.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
**2024:** My government has arbitrarily detained people at the behest of the PRC, such as those who engage in political activism or those who are members of minority groups.
**2022 Law Enforcement 9 (#97):** My government has detained people at the request of the PRC for committing a crime involving engagements with social movements or resistance activities in Hong Kong, Xinjiang or for other human rights or civic rights issues.
*Scope broadened from the 2022 wording.*
### Reworded Indicators
Wording clarified or corrected; scope unchanged.
**2024:** In my country, PRC state media (including print, radio, and video) is broadcasted or distributed in a local language.
**2022 Media 5 (#5):** In my country, PRC state-media (including print, radio, and video) is broadcasted or distributed in a local language.
*Wording corrected; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, local newspapers, online news websites, content farms, or social media platforms receive economic support by regularly featuring advertisements from PRC-connected entities.
**2022 Media 8 (#8):** In my country, there are regular PRC state-media or government advertisements inserted within local newspapers, online news websites or social media.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, there are journalists who have had pressure exerted on them by the PRC, including (but not limited to) public denunciation, revocation of journalist ID, denial of visa, lawsuits, or threat thereof.
**2022 Media 9 (#9):** In my country, there are journalists who have had pressure exerted on them by the PRC, including (but not limited to) public denouncement, revocation of journalist ID, denial of visa.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** My country’s legislature has a joint parliamentary friendship group, committee or other forms of sub-organizations with the PRC.
**2022 Foreign Policy 1 (#12):** My country‘s legislature has a joint parliamentary friendship group, committee or other forms of sub-organizations with PRC.
*Wording corrected; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** Citizens of my country have been detained in the PRC or denied exit for political reasons, a.k.a. “hostage diplomacy.”
**2022 Foreign Policy 5 (#16):** Citizens of my country have been detained in PRC or denied exit visas, and believed to be suffering from unfair legal treatments for political reasons, a.k.a. “hostage diplomacy”.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's territorial claims (such as on the South China Sea arbitration ruling issued by the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal in July 2016); except claims over Taiwan, which are indirectly covered in indicator 7.
**2022 Foreign Policy 8 (#19):** My government has shown support of PRC‘s territorial claims (such as on the South China Sea arbitration ruling issued by the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal in July 2016; except claims over Taiwan, which are indirectly covered in indicator 6.)
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's treatment, governance, or policy towards the Uyghur population in Xinjiang.
**2022 Foreign Policy 9 (#20):** My country has shown one of the following stances on PRC‘s treatment of its Uyghur population.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
Grading also changed from 2022.
**2024:** My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's treatment, governance, or policy toward the Tibet population.
**2022 Foreign Policy 10 (#21):** My country has shown one of the following stances on PRC‘s treatment of its Tibet population.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
Grading also changed from 2022.
**2024:** My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's ongoing repression in Hong Kong, such as the imposition of the National Security Law or other actions to persecute Hong Kong protestors or activists.
**2022 Foreign Policy 11 (#22):** My government has not publicly criticized the PRC‘s imposition of the National Security Law on Hong Kong.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
Grading also changed from 2022.
**2024:** In my country, there are Confucius Institutes/Classrooms or other PRC-affiliated Chinese language centers based at universities.
**2022 Academia 2 (#24):** In my country, there are Confucius Institutes/Classrooms.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** My country plans to include, or does include, Chinese as a foreign language in K-12 or primary education, and receives free or subsidized (e.g. offered below market price) educational books and teachers from the PRC.
**2022 Academia 3 (#25):** My country plans to include, or does include, Chinese as a foreign language in K12 or primary education, and receives free or subsidized (e.g. offered below market price) educational books and teachers from PRC.
*Wording corrected; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, think tanks and academic research centers have received financial benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities, such as through grants, donations, sponsored exchange programs, or fellowship programs at PRC institutions.
**2022 Academia 5 (#27):** In my country, think tanks and academic research centers have received financial support from PRC-connected individuals or entities.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, politicians or government employees at the local (non-national) level visit the PRC and meet with PRC officials and think tanks.
**2022 Domestic Politics 4 (#37):** In my country, politicians or government employees visit the PRC and have meetings with PRC officials and think tanks.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, there are reports of politicians or political parties receiving campaign finance or significant in-kind donations from PRC-connected entities or individuals.
**2022 Domestic Politics 6 (#39):** In my country, there are reports of politicians or political parties receiving campaign donations that originate in the PRC.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** My country has undergone a default or restructuring of a public debt arrangement with PRC-affiliated financial entities, which may have involved the transfer of my country's land or infrastructure in exchange for debt forgiveness.
**2022 Economy 11 (#55):** In my country, PRC-connected entities requisitioned infrastructure or land for failure to repay debts in a timely manner.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, internet service providers have signed agreements to adopt hardware or technical specifications for Wi-Fi or fiber optic/broadband networks that are produced or developed by PRC enterprises.
**2022 Technology 3 (#58):** In my country, telecoms have adopted hardware or technical specifications by PRC-connected entities in internet/wifi/telecommunication service infrastructure projects, in addition to 4G/5G cellular network.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, the central or local government has signed agreements to adopt biometric surveillance technology (such as facial, voice, DNA or gait recognition) produced by PRC-connected entities.
**2022 Technology 5 (#60):** In my country, central or local governments have collaboration (such as data collection or exchange agreement, or adoption of related hardwares) with the PRC government or PRC-connected entities on facial, voice recognition or other applications involving biometrics achieved by AI.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, labor unions have engaged with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) through exchanges or official visits, received material or financial donations, or participated in training sessions offered by the ACFTU on subjects like collective bargaining.
**2022 Society 3 (#69):** In my country, labor unions cooperate on exchanges or official visits to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in the PRC.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, there are Chinese diaspora community events and activities (e.g. Lunar New Year events, Dragon Boat Festival tournaments, etc) hosted or sponsored by organizations or personnel linked to the UFWD, or by PRC diplomats.
**2022 Society 4 (#70):** In my country, there are local reports of personnel linked to the UFWD who make appearances at Chinese diaspora community events and activities (e.g. Lunar New Year events, Dragon Boat festival tournaments, etc).
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, there are PRC-connected professional associations, such as the All-China Journalists Association (中华全国新闻工作者协会), China Artists Association (中国艺术家协会), China Writers Association (中国作家协会) or All-China Women Federation (全国妇联), that are closely engaged with their local counterparts through exchanges or official visits, providing material or financial donations, or hosting training sessions.
**2022 Society 5 (#71):** In my country, there are PRC-connected professional associations that are closely engaged with their counterparts locally, such as All-China Journalists Association (中华全国新闻工作者协会), China Artists Association (中国艺术家协会), China Writers Association (中国作家协会) or All-China Women Federation (全国妇联).
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, polling data or opinion surveys indicate that a majority of citizens hold favorable views toward the PRC government.
**2022 Society 11 (#77):** In my country, a majority of citizens have positive views of the PRC government.
*Wording clarified; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, there are reports that the PRC has expressed intentions or has taken actions to establish bases.
**2022 Military 4 (#81):** In my country, there are reports that the PRC has expressed intentions or has taken actions to establish basing.
*Wording corrected; scope unchanged.*
**2024:** In my country, law enforcement authorities have signed cooperation agreements with the PRC on combating terrorism.
**2022 Law Enforcement 2 (#90):** In my country, law enforcement authorities have signed cooperation agreements with the PRC on combatting terrorism.
*Wording corrected; scope unchanged.*
### Equivalent Indicators
Unchanged in meaning. Scores can be compared directly with the 2022 Indicator shown.
| 2024 Indicator | 2022 Indicator |
| - | - |
| Media 1 (#1) | Media 1 (#1) |
| Media 2 (#2) | Media 2 (#2) |
| Media 4 (#4) | Media 4 (#4) |
| Foreign Policy 3 (#14) | Foreign Policy 3 (#14) |
| Academia 1 (#23) | Academia 1 (#23) |
| Academia 4 (#26) | Academia 4 (#26) |
| Academia 6 (#28) | Academia 6 (#28) |
| Academia 8 (#30) | Academia 8 (#30) |
| Academia 10 (#32) | Academia 10 (#32) |
| Domestic Politics 1 (#34) | Domestic Politics 1 (#34) |
| Domestic Politics 3 (#36) | Domestic Politics 3 (#36) |
| Domestic Politics 7 (#40) | Domestic Politics 7 (#40) |
| Domestic Politics 10 (#43) | Domestic Politics 10 (#43) |
| Economy 1 (#45) | Economy 1 (#45) |
| Economy 3 (#47) | Economy 3 (#47) |
| Economy 4 (#48) | Economy 4 (#48) |
| Economy 5 (#49) | Economy 5 (#49) |
| Economy 6 (#50) | Economy 6 (#50) |
| Economy 9 (#53) | Economy 9 (#53) |
| Economy 10 (#54) | Economy 10 (#54) |
| Technology 1 (#56) | Technology 1 (#56) |
| Technology 2 (#57) | Technology 2 (#57) |
| Technology 6 (#61) | Technology 6 (#61) |
| Technology 9 (#64) | Technology 9 (#64) |
| Technology 11 (#66) | Technology 11 (#66) |
| Society 1 (#67) | Society 1 (#67) |
| Society 2 (#68) | Society 2 (#68) |
| Society 6 (#72) | Society 6 (#72) |
| Society 7 (#73) | Society 7 (#73) |
| Military 1 (#78) | Military 1 (#78) |
| Military 5 (#82) | Military 5 (#82) |
| Military 6 (#83) | Military 6 (#83) |
| Military 9 (#86) | Military 9 (#86) |
| Military 11 (#88) | Military 11 (#88) |
| Law Enforcement 1 (#89) | Law Enforcement 1 (#89) |
| Law Enforcement 3 (#91) | Law Enforcement 3 (#91) |
### Retired Indicators
2022 Indicators that were not carried into 2024.
| 2022 Indicator | Text |
| - | - |
| Media 10 (#10) | In my country, there are incidents of media outlets censoring views critical of the PRC government. |
| Foreign Policy 4 (#15) | In my country, politicians or government employees have been pressured by PRC diplomats to change their political or diplomatic stances. |
| Foreign Policy 6 (#17) | The head of state, head of government or foreign minister of my country has denied Taiwan‘s right to participate as a member, observer or guest in WHO. |
| Foreign Policy 7 (#18) | My country publicly supported the appointment of a PRC official to be the head of a United Nations agency (such as the FAO or ICAO) or other intergovernmental organizations (such as INTERPOL). |
| Academia 11 (#33) | In my country, there are confirmed reports of teachers or professors avoiding the discussion of sensitive political issues (e.g. Uyghur re-education camps, Taiwan independence, Tiananmen Square Massacre). |
| Domestic Politics 8 (#41) | In my country, groups with reported links to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) have made public statements opposing the candidacy of a local political candidate or party, claiming them being “anti-China”. |
| Economy 2 (#46) | PRC-connected entities own more than 50% of my country‘s sovereign debt. |
| Society 8 (#74) | Cultural products (such as films and TV shows) produced by my country‘s production studios typically portray the PRC in a positive light. |
| Society 9 (#75) | In my country, celebrities regularly publish or share propaganda narratives from the PRC. |
| Military 2 (#79) | My country currently exports military or law-enforcement equipment or components of equipment to the PRC. |
| Law Enforcement 4 (#92) | In my country, there are reports of economic espionage targeting the private sector that were suspected to benefit PRC-connected entities. |
| Law Enforcement 8 (#96) | In my country, representatives of the PRC police force have had joint patrols with local law enforcement. |
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