1. In my country, there are journalists or media organizations that are members of, or officially affiliated with, media networks created, organized, or coordinated by PRC-connected entities. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 1 Examples include, but are not limited to, the World Chinese Media Network, the Belt and Road Media Cooperation Alliance/Union, the Belt and Road News Alliance, the Belt and Road Media Community, the Belt and Road Journalists Network, the Belt and Road News Network, and B\&R TV Networks. Additional remark “Officially affiliated” means that the journalist or media organization is publicly identified as a member or partner of the network. Participation in a one-time event, visit, or training does not count without evidence of membership or an ongoing formal affiliation. 2. In my country, there are reports of coordinated information manipulation campaigns suspected of being initiated or directed by the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 2 Campaigns may spread false or misleading information, promote PRC government narratives, or seek to discredit PRC critics. They may use AI-generated or AI-manipulated text, images, audio, or video, including deepfakes, or automated accounts. They may operate directly or through local influencers or other intermediaries. Additional remark Reports must describe the coordinated manipulation and support the suspected PRC link. Pro-PRC views, criticism of PRC critics, or AI use alone does not count. 3. In my country, journalists, media organizations, or online influencers have participated in international travel organized by PRC state-owned media or PRC-connected entities. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 3 4. In my country, there are journalists, media organizations or online influencers who have received training from PRC state-owned media or PRC-connected entities. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 4 5. In my country, PRC state media (including print, radio, and video) is broadcasted or distributed in a local language. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 5 Additional remark This Indicator only refers to PRC state media directly broadcast or distributed by PRC entities. In other words, it may include YouTube channels in the domestic language run by CGTN (a PRC state media organization) or local TV channels operated by CCTV. This Indicator does not cover PRC state media content that is shared indirectly by domestic media outlets through content-sharing agreements. That phenomenon is covered under Media Indicator #7. 6. In my country, there are local media outlets wholly or majority owned by PRC-connected individuals or entities, or media owners who have significant business interests in the PRC. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 6 7. In my country, media outlets have delivered content provided by PRC state-funded media, or under content-sharing agreements with PRC state-funded media. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 7 Additional remark This Indicator measures whether local media outlets broadcast news, video clips, or other content provided by PRC state-funded media. This can be demonstrated through examples or footage of such content. Press statements issued by PRC government agencies do not fall under the category of content provided by PRC state-funded media. 8. In my country, local newspapers, online news websites, content farms, or social media platforms receive economic support by regularly featuring advertisements from PRC-connected entities. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 8 9. In my country, there are journalists who have had pressure exerted on them by the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities after reporting or making public statements that are critical of the PRC, including (but not limited to) public denunciation, denial or cancellation of press credentials or visas, lawsuits or legal threats, doxxing, hacking or attempted hacking of accounts or devices, spyware, or coordinated online harassment or threats, including gender-based or sexualized forms. PressureYes / NoCaseNo. 9 Additional remark Pressure may be exerted directly or through proxies or other intermediaries. Evidence must support a clear link between the specific incident and the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities. When another person or organization carried out the pressure, evidence must show that the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities directed, coordinated, or supported that specific pressure.

General criticism, negative online comments, or ordinary public disagreement alone do not count. The nationality or political views of those involved, or the volume of criticism or harassment, is not sufficient on its own to establish a PRC link. 10. In my country, there are media organizations that describe relations with the PRC as based on friendship, brotherhood, or otherwise use emotive language that refers to the relationship in familial terms. AlignmentGraded 0–4CaseNo. 10 11. In my country, there are media personalities (including reporters, journalists or commentators) or celebrities who echo PRC talking points, such as denying the existence of or whitewashing human rights abuses (e.g. a media personality who rejects that there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang). AlignmentGraded 0–4CaseNo. 11

1. My country’s legislature has an active parliamentary friendship group, committee, or similar body with the PRC. ExposureYes / NoCaseNo. 12 Additional remark “Active” means that the body held at least one documented meeting, official visit, public event, joint activity, or other engagement during the assessment period for the current Index cycle. 2. My country receives foreign aid or significant in-kind donations from the PRC. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 13 3. The PRC provides training to diplomats or civil servants on governance from my country (such as at 国家行政学院 or 中央党校). ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 14 4. Citizens of my country have been detained in the PRC or denied exit for political reasons, a.k.a. “hostage diplomacy.” PressureYes / NoSystemNo. 15 5. My government has formally endorsed, joined, or committed to implementing one or more global initiatives proposed by the PRC government, including the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and Global Governance Initiative (GGI). AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 16 Additional remark “My government” refers to the national (central) government, not subnational or local governments.

Count only support recorded in an official government document, such as a signed agreement, joint statement, action plan, or formal membership in an implementation mechanism such as the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative (GDI).

Attendance at an event, a general statement welcoming international cooperation, a media report, or praise by an individual official does not count unless the government clearly endorses, joins, or commits to implementing the named initiative. 6. My country has signed an agreement with the PRC to classify their diplomatic relationship as a "Strategic Partnership" or beyond. AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 17 Additional remark The PRC classifies some of its diplomatic relations with foreign states based on the strength of their diplomatic ties. The “Strategic Partnership” classification indicates close bilateral ties; diplomatic relations may also be classified using even stronger terms, such as “Innovative Strategic Partnership” or “All-Round Strategic Partnership.” Bilateral relations classified using terms stronger than “Strategic Partnership” also apply to this Indicator.

See: [https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-05-2019-0004/full/pdf?title=chinas-emerging-partnership-network-what-who-where-when-and-why](https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-05-2019-0004/full/pdf?title=chinas-emerging-partnership-network-what-who-where-when-and-why) 7. My country unquestionably uses PRC’s "One China Principle" which articulates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, rather than my country's own "One China Policy." AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 18 Additional remark The “One China principle” is the position held by the PRC and the CCP that there is only one China, that the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Under the U.S. “one China policy,” the U.S. acknowledges the PRC’s position on Taiwan but does not take a position on its validity. Here, “my country’s own ‘one China policy’” is used as an umbrella term for foreign policy formulations similar to the U.S. one China policy that differ from the PRC’s “One China principle.”

[https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/faq-the-united-states-one-china-policy-is-not-the-same-as-the-prc-one-china-principle/](https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/faq-the-united-states-one-china-policy-is-not-the-same-as-the-prc-one-china-principle/) 8. My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's territorial claims (such as on the South China Sea arbitration ruling issued by the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal in July 2016); except claims over Taiwan, which are indirectly covered in indicator 7. AlignmentPosition 0 / 2 / 4No. 19 0 = My country has rejected PRC’s claim; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has adhered to PRC’s claim Additional remark Select Silent if you have checked relevant official records and found no public government position on this issue. Select Skip if the records needed to assess the position are unavailable or too unclear to interpret reliably. In the Supporting Evidence, briefly state what you checked or why you could not determine the position. 9. My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's treatment, governance, or policy towards the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. AlignmentPosition 0 / 2 / 4No. 20 0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance Additional remark Select Silent if you have checked relevant official records and found no public government position on this issue. Select Skip if the records needed to assess the position are unavailable or too unclear to interpret reliably. In the Supporting Evidence, briefly state what you checked or why you could not determine the position. 10. My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's treatment, governance, or policy toward the Tibet population. AlignmentPosition 0 / 2 / 4No. 21 0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance Additional remark Select Silent if you have checked relevant official records and found no public government position on this issue. Select Skip if the records needed to assess the position are unavailable or too unclear to interpret reliably. In the Supporting Evidence, briefly state what you checked or why you could not determine the position. 11. My government has supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC's ongoing repression in Hong Kong, such as the imposition of the National Security Law or other actions to persecute Hong Kong protestors or activists. AlignmentPosition 0 / 2 / 4No. 22 0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance Additional remark Select Silent if you have checked relevant official records and found no public government position on this issue. Select Skip if the records needed to assess the position are unavailable or too unclear to interpret reliably. In the Supporting Evidence, briefly state what you checked or why you could not determine the position.

1. In my country, universities have established research partnerships with PRC-connected entities. (e.g. Huawei, Tencent or Alibaba) ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 23 2. In my country, there are Confucius Institutes, Confucius Classrooms, or other PRC-affiliated educational centers or programs based at universities. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 24 Additional remark A center or program qualifies when documented evidence shows that a PRC government body, PRC university, or another PRC-connected entity participates in establishing or operating it, or provides ongoing support through funding, staff, teaching materials, or curriculum support.

Renamed or successor centers or programs count when evidence shows that such involvement or support continues. Examples may include university-based Luban Workshops that meet these conditions.

In the Supporting Evidence, describe the PRC affiliation and the education or training provided, including any courses or recurring education or training beyond Chinese-language teaching, such as Chinese history, politics, business, or teacher training. Use publicly available sources such as university or center websites, course catalogs, program listings, or annual reports. Chinese-language teaching alone may qualify; education or training beyond language teaching is not required.

To assess significance, consider how important the host university is in your country and how the center or program contributes to teaching or professional training, such as degree programs or teacher training. Explain your judgment and provide evidence in the Supporting Evidence. Teaching subjects beyond Chinese does not automatically justify a higher score. 3. My country plans to include, or does include, Chinese as a foreign language in K-12 or primary education, and receives free or subsidized (e.g. offered below market price) educational books and teachers from the PRC. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 25 4. In my country, one or more think tanks and academic research centers belong to PRC-affiliated networks/associations (such as: the Silk Road Think Tank Association, Silk Road Think Tank Network \[SiLKS], Belt and Road Studies Network, University Alliance of the Silk Road, University Consortium of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 26 5. In my country, think tanks and academic research centers have received financial benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities, such as through grants, donations, sponsored exchange programs, or fellowship programs at PRC institutions. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 27 6. In my country, experts participate in PRC talent recruitment programs such as the Thousand Talents Program or Changjiang Scholars program. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 28 7. In my country, scholars have taken trips to the PRC or to other countries organized or run by PRC-connected individuals or entities. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 29 8. In my country, organized PRC-connected student groups, such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), are involved in attempts to censor staff or students (e.g. by harassing students protesting human rights abuses in the PRC, or formally complaining about the identification of Taiwan as a country in lecture slides). PressureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 30 9. In my country, there are scholars or academics who have had pressure exerted on them by the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities after expressing opinions or producing scholarship that is critical of the PRC, including (but not limited to) denial or cancellation of visas for PRC travel, workplace censure or disciplinary action, lawsuits or legal threats, doxxing, hacking or attempted hacking of accounts or devices, spyware, or coordinated online harassment or threats, including gender-based or sexualized forms. PressureYes / NoCaseNo. 31 Additional remark Pressure may be exerted directly or through proxies or other intermediaries. Evidence must support a clear link between the specific incident and the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities. When another person or organization carried out the pressure, evidence must show that the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities directed, coordinated, or supported that specific pressure.

General criticism, negative online comments, or ordinary public disagreement alone do not count. The nationality or political views of those involved, or the volume of criticism or harassment, is not sufficient on its own to establish a PRC link. 10. In my country, PRC-connected entities have been involved in school or university curriculum design, such as courses about East Asian history, modern politics, etc. AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 32 11. In my country, scholars have published articles that echo PRC talking points, such as denying the existence of or whitewashing human rights abuses (e.g. an academic who rejects that there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang). AlignmentGraded 0–4CaseNo. 33

1. In my country, politicians or government employees at the sub-national level are signing agreements with the PRC government or state-owned enterprises. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 34 Additional remark This indicator measures partnerships at the sub-national or city level. If an agreement is signed at the national level on behalf of a local government, the answer to this indicator should still be “Yes.” 2. In my country, municipalities or provinces have active sister-city or sister-province ties (友好城市) with municipalities or provinces in the PRC. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 35 Additional remark A tie is active when there is documented contact or a joint activity during the assessment period for the current Index cycle, such as a delegation visit, a new or renewed agreement, a funded project, or a joint event. 3. In my country, politicians or government employees have taken trips to the PRC paid for by PRC-connected individuals or entities. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 36 4. In my country, politicians or government employees at the local (non-national) level visit the PRC and meet with PRC officials and think tanks. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 37 5. Representatives of a political party in my country’s national legislature have been invited to visit the PRC or attended events hosted by the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party (中共中央对外联络部), including World Political Parties Summits, CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meetings, BRICS Political Parties Dialogues, Think Tanks and Civil Society Organizations Fora, etc. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 38 6. In my country, there are reports of politicians or political parties receiving campaign finance or significant in-kind donations from PRC-connected entities or individuals. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 39 7. In my country, groups with reported links to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) have hosted fundraising activities or have provided other forms of support for government employees, politicians or parties. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 40 8. In my country, there are politicians, government officials, or political parties that have had pressure exerted on them by the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities after engaging in political activities, making public statements, or advocating policies, including (but not limited to) public denunciation, doxxing, hacking or attempted hacking of accounts or devices, spyware, or coordinated online harassment or threats, including gender-based or sexualized forms. PressureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 41 Additional remark Pressure may be exerted directly or through proxies or other intermediaries. Evidence must support a clear link between the specific incident and the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities. When another person or organization carried out the pressure, evidence must show that the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities directed, coordinated, or supported that specific pressure.

General criticism, negative online comments, or ordinary political disagreement alone do not count. The nationality or political views of those involved, or the volume of criticism or harassment, is not sufficient on its own to establish a PRC link. 9. In my country, politicians or government employees have publicly echoed PRC talking points (e.g. denying PRC human rights issues, arguing that the PRC’s one-party political system could be beneficial for my country’s economic growth). AlignmentGraded 0–4CaseNo. 42 10. In my country, politicians or government employees have received direct or deferred benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities openly or covertly (e.g. have been appointed to lucrative positions as board members or consultants with PRC-invested firms, casinos, energy companies, etc.) during or in retirement from public office. AlignmentGraded 0–4SystemNo. 43 11. In my country, officials, political parties, and political elites try to suppress criticism of the PRC. AlignmentGraded 0–4CaseNo. 44

1. The PRC is my country's number one trading partner (for trade in goods only). ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 45 2. PRC-connected entities own more than 25% of my country’s bilateral sovereign debt. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 46 3. The PRC is the top customer for my country’s extractive industries. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 47 Additional remark We do not include “agroindustry with transgenic seed” in the definition of extractive industries. We define extractive industries as activities that involve the extraction of raw materials from the earth, such as oil, metals, minerals, and aggregates. 4. In my country, PRC-related entities own, operate or substantially control critical infrastructure (e.g. ports, power plants, digital data centers, etc) or sensitive sectors (biotech, raw materials, etc.). ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 48 Additional remark Both in the report "Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects" (download full publication here at: [https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road](https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road)) and the "The People's Map of Global China" website (visit the visualized world map of PRC-connected investments: [https://thepeoplesmap.net/](https://thepeoplesmap.net/)) disclose the infrastructures related to the PRC government and PRC-connected entities. 5. According to the latest available official data, mainland China is among the five largest source economies of inward foreign direct investment in my country. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 49 Additional remark Inward foreign direct investment means investment by foreign investors in businesses located in your country where they have lasting ownership or influence, such as establishing a subsidiary or buying a significant share of a company. For example, if a foreign company opens and owns a factory in your country, or buys a large enough share of a local company to influence how it is managed, this counts as inward foreign direct investment.

Using the latest available end-of-year inward FDI stock data, rank “China, P.R.: Mainland” against other source economies. Do not combine Hong Kong or Macau with mainland China; retain them as separate source economies in the ranking. Record the data year, ranking, and percentage share. No minimum percentage share is required. If the available data are insufficient to determine the ranking, record “Skip,” not “No.” 6. In my country, major businesses are members of the Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce, or of the Belt and Road Industrial and Commercial Alliance, or of the Belt and Road General Chamber of Commerce. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 50 7. In my country, financial institutions use the China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) clearing and settlement services system. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 51 8. My country has been the target of PRC economic coercion (e.g. trade/investment sanctions, boycotts) after the government, private companies, or NGOs made statements or introduced policies deemed unfavorable to the PRC. PressureYes / NoSystemNo. 52 9. My country has free-trade agreement(s) with the PRC (either bilateral or as part of regional agreement(s)) that primarily deal with trade in goods or services, including digital goods or services. AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 53 10. In my country, central or local governments have relaxed or removed regulatory restrictions, or have established special economic zones (or free trade zones, industrial parks, etc.) to attract investments or economic participation from the PRC. AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 54 Additional remark If the country only intends to establish special economic zones to attract investment from the PRC, but no such plan has yet been formalized, the answer to this indicator should remain “No.” We can update the answer in the next edition if the situation changes. However, it would be helpful to include supplementary notes explaining the current situation in the country. 11. My country has undergone a default or restructuring of a public debt arrangement with PRC-affiliated financial entities, which may or may not have involved the transfer of my country's land or infrastructure in exchange for debt forgiveness. AlignmentYes / NoCaseNo. 55

1. In my country, PRC-connected entities (such as China Mobile, China Unicom or China Telecom) or their subsidiaries provide telecom services. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 56 2. In my country, mobile network operators or internet service providers use network equipment or technical standards produced or developed by PRC enterprises, such as Huawei or ZTE. This applies to mobile networks, including 4G and 5G, and to fixed networks, including fiber-optic, broadband, and Wi-Fi networks. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 57 3. My country’s national government has formally endorsed or joined a PRC-led international initiative on digital governance, cybersecurity, or artificial intelligence governance. AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 58 Additional remark Count only formal endorsement, signature, or membership recorded in an official agreement, joint statement, or list of participating governments. Attendance at a conference or meeting does not count. The initiative must have been introduced or formally led by the PRC government.

Examples include the Global Initiative on Data Security, the Global AI Governance Initiative, and related intergovernmental mechanisms such as the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO). 4. In my country, technology equipment supplied by PRC-connected entities is used in critical infrastructure, including telecommunications and broadcast networks, airports, public transport, government IT networks, ports, power systems, or data centers. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 59 Additional remark Count equipment installed in an earlier year if it remains installed and in operational use. In the evidence notes, state whether the equipment was installed before the review period (“legacy equipment”) or was newly installed or expanded during the review period. Authorization, a procurement announcement, a trial, or a planned installation does not count without evidence that the equipment has been installed and is being used. 5. In my country, the central or local government has signed agreements to adopt biometric surveillance technology (such as facial, voice, DNA or gait recognition) produced by PRC-connected entities. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 60 6. In my country, one or more cities have procured, or have signed contracts with PRC-connected entities to establish “smart city” systems. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 61 Additional remark On the "Mapping China's Technology Giants" website, the expansion of key Chinese technology companies is shown. You may visit the website here at: [https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage/](https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage/) to acquire data described in the Indicator. 7. My country is directly served by a subsea or land-based major fiber optic internet cable built by a PRC-connected entity, or has greenlit plans for one to be built in the future. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 62 8. In my country, PRC-affiliated venture capital, financial firms or PRC government entities invest in local technology start-ups. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 63 9. In my country, companies have publicly announced that they had signed MOUs to collaborate on technological development (such as collaborations in A.I., Blockchain, Cloud Computing, Big Data) with PRC-connected entities. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 64 10. My country has signed space cooperation agreements or memorandums of understanding, or formed space cooperation mechanisms with PRC-connected entities. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 65 11. In my country, the central or local government(s) has collaborated with the PRC on endorsing the use of the BeiDou satellite navigation system. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 66 Additional remark If there are ongoing discussions about adopting the BeiDou Satellite Navigation System but no contract has been finalized, the answer should remain “No.” We can update the answer in the next edition if the situation changes. However, it would be helpful to include supplementary notes explaining the current situation in the country. For international collaborations, local respondents can check the following link: [http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/gjhz/index.html](http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/gjhz/index.html). Please note that the information is only shown on the Simplified Chinese version website.

1. In my country, there are local groups or organizations with words like “Promotion of Peaceful Reunification” in their name, and they regularly publicize their views on Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang issues. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 67 Additional remark Local respondents may check the following link to find out whether there are activities affiliated to "Promotion of Peaceful Reunification" within Index countries: [http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtchdt/](http://www.zhongguotongcuhui.org.cn/hnwtchdt/) 2. In my country, there are individuals or organizations that are members of, hold formal roles in, or are formally affiliated with PRC United Front organizations, including (but not limited to) the United World Chinese Association (UWCA; 世界华人协会), the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA; 中华海外联谊会), or the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC; 中华全国归国华侨联合会). ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 68 Additional remark The individuals or organizations must be based in the country. A regional designation or a reference to the country in an organization’s name does not by itself establish this.

PRC United Front organizations include bodies within the CCP’s united front system and organizations with documented formal ties to those bodies, such as organizational affiliation or leadership appointments. Cite official records or reliable published research documenting these ties.

Formal roles or affiliations include membership, member-organization or branch status, representative offices, and appointments as officers, council or committee members, overseas members, or advisers. Reliable public evidence must show that the role or affiliation is current during the assessment period.

A meeting, visit, event, donation, award, photograph, or informal contact does not establish a formal affiliation by itself. Chinese ethnicity, a similar organization name, or a pro-PRC position alone is insufficient.

For further examples and sources, see Cheryl Yu, Harnessing the People: Mapping Overseas United Front Work in Democratic States (The Jamestown Foundation, 2026). This is a non-exhaustive reference; the evidence must still meet the criteria above.

[https://jamestown.org/harnessing-the-people-mapping-overseas-united-front-work-in-democratic-states/](https://jamestown.org/harnessing-the-people-mapping-overseas-united-front-work-in-democratic-states/) 3. In my country, labor unions have engaged with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) through exchanges or official visits, received material or financial donations, or participated in training sessions offered by the ACFTU on subjects like collective bargaining. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 69 4. In my country, there are Chinese diaspora community events and activities (e.g. Lunar New Year events, Dragon Boat Festival tournaments, etc) hosted or sponsored by organizations or personnel linked to the UFWD, or by PRC diplomats. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 70 5. In my country, there are PRC-connected professional associations, such as the All-China Journalists Association (中华全国新闻工作者协会), China Artists Association (中国艺术家协会), China Writers Association (中国作家协会) or All-China Women Federation (全国妇联), that are closely engaged with their local counterparts through exchanges or official visits, providing material or financial donations, or hosting training sessions. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 71 6. In my country, PRC-connected individuals or entities donate money or provide other types of support to religious communities and charities. ExposureYes / NoCaseNo. 72 7. In my country, the PRC government or PRC-connected entities distribute entertainment products (including: drama and TV shows) or related hardware (e.g. OTT streaming players hosting PRC media channels) freely or at a cheap price. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 73 8. In my country, PRC-connected entities are the main shareholders or developers of at least one of the top five most popular social media/messaging apps, based on usage. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 74 Additional remark This indicator measures app usage rather than download numbers. However, if the respondent is confident that the app is widely used but cannot find publicly available usage data, download numbers may be used as supporting evidence. 9. In my country, there are cultural events, cultural exchange projects, or cultural organizations that are funded by or receive funding from PRC-connected entities, including in sports. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 75 10. In my country, religious organizations or religious leaders have participated in exchanges, visits, training, or joint events with PRC state-controlled religious bodies, such as the Islamic Association of China, the Buddhist Association of China, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, or the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 76 Additional remark Record the participating religious organization or leader, the PRC counterpart, the activity, and the date. Attendance at the same conference or event alone does not count without evidence of an exchange or joint activity between them. Record any funding or material support, if available; such support is not required. Participation alone does not prove political alignment. 11. In my country, polling data or opinion surveys indicate that a majority of citizens hold favorable views toward the PRC government. AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 77 Additional remark Answer No if a suitable poll shows that 50% or fewer hold favorable views toward the PRC government. Answer Skip if no suitable poll is available, including when available surveys ask only about Chinese people or culture rather than the PRC government.

1. My country currently imports (or receives in-kind donation of) military or law-enforcement equipment or components of equipment from the PRC. ExposureYes / NoCaseNo. 78 2. My country’s government has participated in one or more multilateral security dialogues organized by the PRC (e.g. China-Africa Peace and Security Forum; the Conference on Interaction & Confidence Building Measures in Asia). ExposureYes / NoCaseNo. 79 3. My country co-develops or co-produces military or law-enforcement equipment with the PRC (including arrangements where PLA-affiliated professionals work in domestic labs researching dual-use technologies). ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 80 4. In my country, there are reports that the PRC has expressed intentions or has taken actions to establish bases. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 81 5. In my country, forces or groups involved in an armed conflict have received military support from the PRC, directly or through intermediaries. ExposureYes / NoCaseNo. 82 Additional remark If no armed conflict took place within the assessed country during the assessment period, answer No, not Skip. The conflict must take place within the assessed country. Recipients may include government forces, foreign forces, or organized armed groups, including groups fighting against the government. Support may include weapons, ammunition, military equipment, financing for military operations, logistical support, military advisers, or combat personnel.

Evidence must show that a PRC government body, the PLA, a PRC state-owned company, or an actor acting on behalf of the PRC provided or arranged support for a party in that specific conflict. PRC-made equipment or a delivery during wartime alone is insufficient.

Support may count even if it is also recorded under the indicators on military equipment transfers or joint development and production. Humanitarian assistance and United Nations peacekeeping do not count. 6. In my country, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military personnel are permanently or rotationally deployed (excluding defense attaches and peacekeepers). ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 83 7. In my country, military professionals have participated in military education or training programs provided by the PRC. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 84 8. In my country, senior military or civilian defense leaders have participated in bilateral meetings with PLA officers at or above the one-star rank. ExposureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 85 9. In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officers have received direct or deferred benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities openly or covertly (e.g. have been appointed to lucrative positions as board members or consultants with PRC-invested firms, casinos, energy companies, etc.) during or in retirement from public service. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 86 10. In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officials publicly advocate for friendly foreign policy or military cooperation with the PRC. AlignmentYes / NoCaseNo. 87 11. My country cooperates with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on military exchange exercises, including drills and war games. AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 88

1. My country currently maintains an extradition treaty, legal mutual assistance or other similar arrangements with the PRC. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 89 2. In my country, law enforcement authorities have signed cooperation agreements with the PRC on combating terrorism. ExposureYes / NoSystemNo. 90 3. In my country, PRC-connected gangs (such as Triad, 三合会) are known to be operating in my country. ExposureYes / NoCaseNo. 91 4. In my country, security services (安保/保安) offered by private PRC companies are contracted by national or subnational governments. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 92 5. In my country, law enforcement and judicial-related training offered by PRC-connected individuals or entities have been accepted by national or subnational governments. ExposureGraded 0–4SystemNo. 93 6. In my country, organized local criminal groups are known to have threatened or used violence to coerce, intimidate, or punish individuals critical of the PRC. PressureGraded 0–4CaseNo. 94 Additional remark Where available, record evidence linking the threats or violence to the PRC or PRC-connected individuals or entities. Such evidence is not required for a Yes answer, and a link should not be inferred solely from the targeted individual's criticism of the PRC.

A Yes answer does not require separate proof that the threats or violence were motivated by the individual’s criticism of the PRC. Intimidation may be presented as a private dispute, and even an incident with a private origin may have a silencing or intimidating effect on PRC critics. Requiring proof of motive or PRC direction would make results more dependent on differences in investigative capacity and the public availability of evidence.

The incident must still meet the conditions in the indicator: threats or violence by organized local criminal groups to coerce, intimidate, or punish an individual critical of the PRC. A Yes answer does not, by itself, establish that the PRC directed or supported the incident. 7. In my country, there are reports of cyber attacks targeting government, critical infrastructure, or enterprises that are suspected as being initiated by the PRC. PressureYes / NoCaseNo. 95 8. In my country, PRC-connected individuals or entities have established extra-legal physical premises from which to surveil or detain members of the Chinese diaspora (e.g. overseas police service stations). PressureYes / NoSystemNo. 96 Additional remark If the country only intends to conduct joint patrols with PRC police, but no such arrangement has yet been formalized or implemented, the answer to this indicator should remain “No.” We can update the answer in the next edition if the situation changes. However, it would be helpful to include supplementary notes explaining the current situation in the country. 9. My government has arbitrarily detained people at the behest of the PRC, such as those who engage in political activism or those who are members of minority groups. AlignmentYes / NoCaseNo. 97 10. My country has extradited or deported individuals to the PRC despite criticism from politicians, government employees, or NGOs. AlignmentYes / NoCaseNo. 98 11. My country has deployed video or internet surveillance systems from the PRC for law enforcement. AlignmentYes / NoSystemNo. 99