Overview
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About Doublethink Lab
Changed Established in 2019, Doublethink Lab (Doublethink) is a civil society organization (CSO) devoted to studying the malign influence of strengthening global democratic resilience by enhancing digital defenses against authoritarianism. Doublethink’s strengths lie in the ability to combine a diverse set of research approaches in the social, behavioral, and computational sciences to study state-funded propaganda campaigns, psychological warfare, and related foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations. As coordinator of the China In The World (CITW) network and the China Index, Doublethink seeks to foster global networks connecting academics, democracy movements, digital communities, like-minded CSOs, cross-regional collaboration between stakeholders devoted to the study and experts on understanding of the People’s Republic of China, in order to strengthen China’s global democratic resilience. influence.
About China In The World (CITW)
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Methodology in brief
Key Definitions
Changed Domain: A specific area in which the Index measures the extent to which the PRC may exert exerts its influence.
Changed The data underlying the China Index is collected via Indicators distributed to regional partners. Regional Partners. Eligible partners include qualified and nonpartisan research institutes, think tanks, community representatives, as well as civil society organizations and independent journalists.
Changed Considering the challenge of collecting data on a global scale, the Index solely focuses on fact-based Indicators, and which are framed in a way designed to avoid eliciting opinions, preferences, or judgements from respondents.
Changed To minimize potential bias, bias and inaccuracies, we ask regional partners Regional Partners to consult and verify the data with as many local experts as possible. Each response should be backed by evidence from at least one supporting reference; this supporting evidence is published as part of the China Index.
Timeframe
Changed The Indicators are compiled based upon observations made from January of the previous year, up to the deadline for response submission. For example, responses for the China Index Beta edition of 36 countries were collected by March 2021; therefore, they and intend to capture PRC influence from January 2020 to March 2021. Regional partners Partners aim to provide documentary evidence current within 18 months of the deadline, though older documents are accepted if they evidence a continuous phenomenon.
Changed China Index rankings are determined by summing scores for all 99 Indicators and dividing by the maximum possible score for each country, which varies as some regional partners Regional Partners may choose to skip Indicators in some countries.
Indicator development
Indicator selection process
Changed Doublethink coordinated coordinates with the Index Committee to develop and select the most relevant Indicators for each Domain. The first edition set of Indicators were designed delivered in January and February 2021. Revised and updated indicators were sent out in December 2023.
Design guidelines
Changed Index scope: Each of the 9 Domains contains 11 Indicators. A total of 99 Indicators were sent to regional partners Regional Partners to conduct the research. Indicator responses are designed to be completed within 30 minutes.
Changed Response recency: Each Indicator focuses on one issue that reflects the current status of PRC influence in the target country, focusing on events or incidents that occurred within the Index timeframe. However, if such an event is a continuous one, evidence prior to the timeframe is acceptable. For example, the Indicator “Are there Confucius Institutes in your country?” does not intend to show whether the Confucius Institutes were established within the timeframe; rather, it intends to show whether the Confucius Institute exists. Therefore, evidence that Confucius Institutes were established within a reasonable timeframe before our research (and have not since been discontinued) is accepted.
Changed Balance: Indicators within a single Domain are designed conceived to cover equal scope within that Domain, such that each Indicator merits equal weight within its Domain.
Indicator development process
Changed Candidate Indicators relevant to measuring PRC influence in each Domain are suggested by the Index Committee in collaboration with Doublethink. Candidate Indicators are then modified to fit the grading system. The final set of 11 Indicators capture the most important aspects of PRC influence. influence at the time.
Grading system
Changed Continuing with the example of university CSSAs, should there be a country with CSSAs at multiple universities, respondents are asked to consider the Indicator at the maximum significance level – in other words, responses should reflect the most significant university at which there is a CSSA. Regional partners Partners and local experts provide similarly concrete interpretations for other graded Indicators.
Layer system
Changed The Indicators fall into three layers Layers that classify PRC influence: exposure, pressure, Exposure, Pressure, and effect. Alignment.
Changed The majority of the Indicators measure the exposure Exposure of a country to a mechanism of PRC influence – e.g. economic dependence, collaboration, or receiving some form of benefit. Some Indicators ask about pressure Pressure overtly applied through these mechanisms of PRC influence – e.g. threatening economic punishment to provoke or prevent a political decision. Other Indicators ask about the observable effect Alignment brought about through mechanisms of influence, or changes in decision-making in favor of PRC interests – e.g. loosening of business regulations to facilitate inbound PRC investment. These three layers form a causal chain, from exposure via pressure to effect, that captures the PRC influence process.
Changed Some have argued that exposure-linked Exposure-linked Indicators are an inadequate measure of PRC influence, and that Indicators should only encompass the effect of PRC influence. Many Index consumers nonetheless consider exposure Exposure to be an important measure of PRC influence with relevance to the work of policymakers, academics, and advocates. We argue that if the final set of Indicators tests for layers Layers of influence from exposure to pressure including Exposure, Pressure and effect, Alignment, then countries that are experiencing significant effects impacts from PRC influence will regardless be ranked highly in overall and Domain-level scores. Meanwhile, the Index will capture all phenomena of interest.
Exclusion of measures of resistance to influence
Changed One consideration faced in the methodology Methodology was whether to measure resistance to PRC influence. We excluded Indicators referring to referencing opposition to influence for the sake of simplicity and conceptual clarity. In many instances, questions about resistance are conceptual opposites to influence effects – e.g. instead of asking whether a country has introduced legislation to ban Huawei from 5G networks, we can ask whether Huawei 5G technology has been included.
Data collection
Regional partner and geography selection
Changed We run open recruiting calls and reach out to members in our trusted CITW network. Regional partners Partners are recruited via CITW participants and contracted to manage the research and coordinate with local experts to answer Indicators. For each Index round, regional partners select up to five Index, Regional Partners cover countries in which they are qualified and confident to conduct research.
Indicator response guidelines
Changed Supporting evidence: References supporting the chosen response. The evidence provided must be appropriate and sound. Accepted forms of evidence will be limited to a functional URL URLs at the time of publication that directs direct to news accounts, official documents, think tank reports, NGO publications, academic papers, interviews, and books published within 4 years. Social media posts or other sources may be accepted if deemed appropriate but are generally discouraged.
Reducing the impact of bias
Changed Regional partners Partners are responsible for collecting data by consulting with local experts. Indicators should be answered by consulting at least one local expert. There is no limitation for the number of Indicators for which an expert can be consulted, as long as they have qualified expertise.
Changed Indicators that regional partners Regional Partners consider irrelevant or cannot answer may be skipped. Respondents will be requested to skip no more than 10 Indicators (10%).
Changed Regional partners Partners should find as many qualified and trustworthy local experts within a country as possible. In politically-constrained countries, we allow partners to collect data through a minimum of one local expert respondent and one additional reviewer.
Changed Selected local experts may or may not be affiliated with the corresponding regional partner. Regional Partner. If experts are affiliated with the regional partner, Regional Partner, they must be excluded from the administration of the project and the data collection and verification processes, so as to avoid procedural conflicts.
Changed Situations in which regional partners Regional Partners may reach out to a secondary expert to answer the Indicators: (a) If the confidence of answers from the first respondent are low; (b) if the results from the first respondent contain too many unanswered Indicators.
Index Committee
Changed In January-February 2021, Doublethink coordinated with the Index Committee members below to develop and select the 11 most relevant and diverse Indicators for each Domain. In 2023, Doublethink reconvened the Index Committee to revise the Indicators, with an eye to providing a complete and up to date picture of PRC influence.
Project Directors
Changed Ttcat (Min-hsuan Wu) is the co-founder and CEO of Doublethink Lab, a Taiwan-based organization that operates at the intersection of the internet, public discourse, civil society, and democratic governance. Doublethink Lab is researching modern researches evolving threats to democracy and devising devises strategies to counter them. He is focused on mapping PRC online information operation mechanisms and facilitating the global CSO network civil society networks to combat digital authoritarianism. Over a decade and a half, Ttcat has committed to LGBTIQA+, environmental, open government, and digital rights movements as an activist and campaigner.
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Index Committee Members 2023-24
Changed Bonnie S. Glaser is director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Glaser is concomitantly a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. For more than three decades, Ms. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy. From 2008 to mid-2015, she was a senior adviser with the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, and from 2003 to 2008, she was a senior associate in the CSIS International Security Program. Prior to joining CSIS, she served as a consultant for various U.S. government offices, including the Departments of Defense and State. Ms. Glaser has published widely in academic and policy journals, including the Washington Quarterly, China Quarterly, Asian Survey, International Security, Contemporary Southeast Asia, American Foreign Policy Interests, Far Eastern Economic Review, and Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, as well as in leading newspapers such as the New York Times and International Herald Tribune Wall Street Journal and in various edited volumes on Asian security. She is also a regular contributor to the Pacific Forum web journal Comparative Connections. She is currently a board member of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and a member of both the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. She served as a member of the Defense Department’s Defense Policy Board China Panel in 1997. Ms. Glaser received her B.A. in political science from Boston University and her M.A. with concentrations in international economics and Chinese studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Changed Glenn Tiffert is a distinguished research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, where he manages co-chairs its project Program on China’s Global Sharp Power. the US, China, and the World and leads Stanford’s participation in the US National Science Foundation’s SECURE program, a $67 million effort to enhance the security and integrity of the US research enterprise. A historian of modern China, Dr. Tiffert’s Tiffert‘s academic research focuses on the PRC’s PRC‘s political and legal systems. His publications include studies on the Chinese judiciary, the drafting of the PRC Constitution, and more recently disinformation and digital censorship of the historical record. He works closely with government and civil society partners in the United States and elsewhere around the world to document and build resilience against authoritarian interference with democratic institutions, particularly in the knowledge sector.
Changed J. Michael Cole is a Taipei-based senior fellow with the Global Taiwan Institute in Washington, D.C., the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Ottawa, Canada, and the Taiwan Studies Programme at the University of Nottingham, UK. Prior to moving to Taiwan in 2005, he was an analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in Ottawa. He holds a Master’s Master‘s Degree in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada. His two latest books, Cross-Strait Relations Since 2016: The End of the Illusion (Routledge) and Insidious Power: How China Undermines Global Democracy (co-edited with Dr. Hsu Szu-chien; Eastbridge), were both published in 2020.
Changed Michael Mazza is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he analyzes US defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese military modernization, cross–Taiwan Strait relations, Korean Peninsula security, and US interests in Southeast Asia. He is also a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) and a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He writes regularly for the Global Taiwan Brief, GTI’s GTI‘s biweekly publication, and he has contributed to numerous AEI studies on American grand strategy in Asia, US defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific, and Taiwanese defense strategy. His published work includes pieces in The Wall Street Journal Asia, Los Angeles Times, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign Policy.
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Index Committee Members 2021
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The indicators
Media
Changed 3. In my country, there are journalists, media organizations organizations, or online influencers who have attended all-expenses paid participated in international travel organized by PRC state-owned media tours in PRC. or PRC-connected entities. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 5. In my country, PRC state-media state media (including print, radio, and video) is broadcasted or distributed in a local language. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 6. In my country, there are local media outlets wholly or partly majority owned by PRC citizens PRC-connected individuals or corporations. entities, or media owners who have significant business interests in the PRC. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 7. In my country, there are media outlets that have delivered cheap or free contents content provided by PRC state-fund state-funded media, or under content-sharing agreements with PRC state-funded media. [See Additional Remark] (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed Additional remark on this Indicator: This Indicator measures whether local media outlets broadcast news, video clips, or other contents provided by PRC state-fund media. media (content-sharing agreements). The phenomenon can be observed via footages footage of content pieces. Therefore, press statement statements from PRC governmental agencies do not fall into the category of contents content provided by PRC state-fund media.
Changed 8. In my country, there are regular PRC state-media or government advertisements inserted within local newspapers, online news websites websites, content farms, or social media. media platforms receive economic support by regularly featuring advertisements from PRC-connected entities. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 9. In my country, there are journalists who have had pressure exerted on them by the PRC, including (but not limited to) public denouncement, denunciation, revocation of journalist ID, denial of visa. visa, lawsuits, or threat thereof. YES/NO
Changed 10. In my country, there are confirmed reports of teachers media organizations that describe relations with the PRC as based on friendship, brotherhood, or professors avoiding otherwise use emotive language that refers to the discussion of sensitive political issues (e.g. Uyghur re-education camps, Taiwan independence, Tiananmen Square Massacre). relationship in familial terms. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 11. In my country, there are media personalities (including reporters, journalists or commentators) or celebrities who deny echo PRC talking points, such as denying the existence of or whitewashing human rights abuses in the PRC (e.g. a media personality who rejects that doubts there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang). (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
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Academia
Changed 2. In my country, there are Confucius Institutes/Classrooms. Institutes/Classrooms or other PRC-affiliated Chinese language centers based at universities. [See Additional Remark] (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant).
Changed 3. My country plans to include, or does include, Chinese as a foreign language in K12 K-12 or primary education, and receives free or subsidized (e.g. offered below market price) educational books and teachers from the PRC. YES/NO
Changed 5. In my country, think tanks and academic research centers have received financial support benefits from PRC-connected individuals or entities. entities, such as through grants, donations, sponsored exchange programs, or fellowship programs at PRC institutions. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 7. In my country, scholars have taken trips to the PRC paid for or to other countries organized or run by PRC-connected individuals or entities. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 9. In my country, scholars or academics have been denied visas to travel to the PRC pressured after expressing opinions or producing scholarship that is critical of the PRC. PRC, including via visa denials for PRC travel, workplace censure, lawsuits, legal challenges, or threats thereof. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
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Added 11. In my country, scholars have published articles that echo PRC talking points, such as denying the existence of or whitewashing human rights abuses (e.g. an academic who rejects that there are re-education camps for Uyghurs in Xinjiang). (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
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Economy
Changed 2. PRC-connected entities own more than 50% 25% of my country’s bilateral sovereign debt. YES/NO
Changed Additional remark on this Indicator: We do not include “agroindustry with transgenic seed” in the definition of extractive industries. We consider extractive industries as different activities that lead to the extraction of raw materials from the earth (such as oil, metals, minerals and aggregates).
Changed Additional remark on this Indicator: Both in the report “Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects” (download full publication here at: https://www.aiddata.org/publications/banking-on-the-belt-and-road ) and on the “The People’s Map of Global China” website (visit the visualized world map of PRC-connected investments: https://thepeoplesmap.net/ ) disclose the infrastructures related to the PRC government and PRC-connected entities.
Changed 7. In my country, financial institutions use the China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) clearing and settlement services system. YES/NO system.YES/NO
Changed 8. My country has been the target of PRC economic coercion (e.g. trade trade/investment sanctions, boycotts) after the government, private companies, or investment sanctions) that was specifically tailored at products NGOs made statements or services that are highly dependent on introduced policies deemed unfavorable to the PRC market. PRC. YES/NO
Added 11. My country has undergone a default or restructuring of a public debt arrangement with PRC-affiliated financial entities, which may have involved the transfer of my country’s land or infrastructure in exchange for debt forgiveness. YES/NO
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Removed 8. In my country, local businesses have been harassed, threatened, or boycotted, due to their activities or statements in support of causes deemed unacceptable by the PRC government (e.g. Taiwanese independence, Hong Kong democracy, Tibet or Xinjiang issues, etc). YES/NO
Removed 11. In my country, PRC-connected entities requisitioned infrastructure or land for failure to repay debts in a timely manner. YES/NO
Society
Changed 4. In my country, there are local reports of personnel linked to the UFWD who make appearances at Chinese diaspora community events and activities (e.g. Lunar New Year events, Dragon Boat festival Festival tournaments, etc). etc) hosted or sponsored by organizations or personnel linked to the UFWD, or by PRC diplomats. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 5. In my country, there are PRC-connected professional associations that are closely engaged with their counterparts locally, associations, such as the All-China Journalists Association (中华全国新闻工作者协会), China Artists Association (中国艺术家协会), China Writers Association (中国作家协会) or All-China Women Federation (全国妇联). (全国妇联), that are closely engaged with their local counterparts through exchanges or official visits, providing material or financial donations, or hosting training sessions. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 7. In my country, the PRC government or PRC-connected entities distribute entertainment products (including: drama and TV shows) or related hardwares (e.g. OTT streaming players hosting PRC media channels) freely or at a cheap price. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 8. In my country, PRC-connected entities are the main shareholders or developers of the top five popular social media/messaging apps, based on their usage. [See Additional Remark] YES/NO
Changed Additional remark on this Indicator: This Indicator indicator measures the “usage” of the apps instead of download numbers. However, if the respondent is certain about the usage but can’t manage to find public data, then download numbers can be used as supporting evidence. For download number, local respondents can check the following link: https://sensortower.com/android/rankings/top/mobile/cambodia/overall?locale=zh-CN&iap=all&watch_enabled&rankings_type=free&min_cost=0&max_cost&date=2021-06-12&show_store_dat=true
Changed 9. In my country, there are reports of economic espionage targeting the private sector cultural events, cultural exchange projects, or cultural organizations that were suspected to benefit are funded by or receive funding from PRC-connected entities. entities, including in sports. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 10. In my country, there are incidents gamers, gaming communities, or game developers/publishers have been involved in freedom of media outlets censoring views critical of speech controversies related to the PRC government. PRC. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 11. In my country, polling data or opinion surveys indicate that a majority of citizens have positive hold favorable views of toward the PRC government. YES/NO
Added 3. In my country, labor unions have engaged with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) through exchanges or official visits, received material or financial donations, or participated in training sessions offered by the ACFTU on subjects like collective bargaining. YES/NO
Removed 3. In my country, labour unions cooperate on exchanges or official visits to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in the PRC. YES/NO
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Removed 8. Cultural products (such as films and TV shows) produced by my country’s production studios typically portray the PRC in a positive light. YES/NO
Military
Changed 3. My country co-develops or co-produces military or law-enforcement equipment with the PRC. PRC (including arrangements where PLA-affiliated professionals work in domestic labs researching dual-use technologies). YES/NO
Changed 4. In my country, there are reports that the PRC has expressed intentions or has taken actions to establish basing. bases. YES/NO
Changed 5. In my country, the PLA People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has participated in a humanitarian relief/disaster assistance (HADR) effort. YES/NO
Changed 6. In my country, PLA People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military personnel are permanently or rotationally deployed (excluding defense attaches and peacekeepers). YES/NO
Changed 7. In my country, members of the military professionals have received professional participated in military education from or training programs provided by the PRC. YES/NO
Changed 8. Representatives of a political party In my country, senior military or civilian defense leaders have participated in my country’s national legislature have met officially bilateral meetings with representatives of PLA officers at or above the PRC. one-star rank. (0 = No; no; 1 = Few, few, but insignificant; 2 = More more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = Few, few, but significant; 4 = More more than a few, and significant)
Changed 10. In my country, high-ranking retired or current military and/or intelligence officials publicly advocate for more coordination friendly foreign policy or military cooperation with the PLA. PRC. YES/NO
Added 2. My country’s government has participated in one or more multilateral security dialogues organized by the PRC (e.g. China-Africa Peace and Security Forum; the Conference on Interaction & Confidence Building Measures in Asia). YES/NO
Removed 2. My country currently exports military or law-enforcement equipment or components of equipment to the PRC. YES/NO
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Removed 8. In my country, members of the military have received peacekeeping training from the PRC. YES/NO
Law Enforcement
Changed 2. In my country, law enforcement authorities have signed cooperation agreements with the PRC on combatting combating terrorism. YES/NO
Changed 3. In my country, PRC connected PRC-connected gangs (such as Triad, 三合会) are known to be operating in my country country. YES/NO.
Changed 5. In my country, law enforcement and judicial related judicial-related training offered by PRC-connected individuals or entities has have been accepted by national or subnational governments. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 6. In my country, triads organized local criminal groups are known to have threatened or used violence to coerce, intimidate intimidate, or punish Chinese dissidents. individuals critical of the PRC. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 7. In my country, there are reports of cyber attacks targeting government, critical infrastructure, or enterprises, enterprises that were suspected to be initiated from the PRC. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant) YES/NO
Changed 10. My country has extradited or has deported individuals to the PRC, although such decisions had attracted criticisms PRC despite criticism from politicians, government employees employees, or from local or foreign NGOs. YES/NO
Added 8. In my country, PRC-connected individuals or entities have established extra-legal physical premises from which to surveil or detain members of the Chinese diaspora (e.g. overseas police service stations). YES/NO
Added 9. My government has arbitrarily detained people at the behest of the PRC, such as those who engage in political activism or those who are members of minority groups. YES/NO
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Removed 8. In my country, representatives of the PRC police force have had joint patrols with local law enforcement. YES/NO
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Removed 9. My government has detained people at the request of the PRC for committing a crime involving engagements with social movements or resistance activities in Hong Kong, Xinjiang or for other human rights or civic rights issues. YES/NO
Removed 10. My country has deported Taiwan citizens to the PRC to face prosecution. YES/NO
Technology
Changed 3. In my country, telecoms internet service providers have adopted signed agreements to adopt hardware or technical specifications for Wi-Fi or fiber optic/broadband networks that are produced or developed by PRC-connected entities in internet/wifi/telecommunication service infrastructure projects, in addition to 4G/5G cellular network. PRC enterprises. (0 = No; 1 = Few, but insignificant; 2 = More than a few, but insignificant; 3 = Few, but significant; 4 = More than a few, and significant)
Changed 4. In my country, PRC-connected entities are authorized vendors to supply tech related tech-related equipment or services to our government, military or security services. for critical infrastructure (such as airports, public transport, government IT networks, ports etc.). YES/NO
Changed 5. In my country, the national central or local governments regularly publish government has signed agreements to adopt biometric surveillance technology (such as facial, voice, DNA or share propaganda narratives from the PRC (e.g. statements from the PRC government or embassies). gait recognition) produced by PRC-connected entities. (0 = no; No; 1 = few, Few, but insignificant; 2 = more More than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, Few, but significant; 4 = more More than a few, and significant)
Changed 6. In my country, one or more cities have procured, or have signed contracts with PRC-connected entities to establish “smart city” systems. city systems.” (0 = No; 1 = Few, but insignificant; 2 = More than a few, but insignificant; 3 = Few, but significant; 4 = More than a few, and significant)
Changed Additional remark on this Indicator: On the “Mapping China’s Tech Giant’s” website, the track of the expansion of key Chinese technology companies is shown. You may visit the website here at: https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage/ to acquire data described in the Indicator.
Changed 8. In my country, PRC-connected PRC-affiliated venture capital invests capital, financial firms or PRC government entities invest in local technology start-ups. (0 = No; 1 = Few, but insignificant; 2 = More than a few, but insignificant; 3 = Few, but significant; 4 = More than a few, and significant)
Changed 11. In my country, the central or local government(s) has collaborated with the PRC on endorsing the use of the Beidou satellite navigation system. YES/NO
Changed Additional remark on this indicator: If there is ongoing discussion of the Beidou satellite navigation system with no closed contract, the answer remains “NO”. We can update the answer next year to see how it changes. But it will be great to put supplementary notes to further indicate the situation in the country. For international collaborations, local respondents can check the following link: http://www.beidou.gov.cn/zt/gjhz/index.html Please note that the information is only shown on the Simplified Chinese version website.
Added 7. My country is directly served by a subsea or land-based major fiber optic internet cable built by a PRC-connected entity, or has greenlit plans for one to be built in the future. YES/NO
Added 10. My country has signed space cooperation agreements or memorandums of understanding, or formed space cooperation mechanisms with PRC-connected entities. YES/NO
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Removed 5. In my country, central or local governments have collaboration (such as data collection or exchange agreement, or adoption of related hardwares) with PRC government or PRC-connected entities on facial, voice recognition or other applications involving biometrics achieved by AI. (0 = No; 1 = Few, but insignificant; 2 = More than a few, but insignificant; 3 = Few, but significant; 4 = More than a few, and significant)
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Domestic Politics
Changed 1. In my country, politicians or government employees at the sub-national level are signing agreements with the PRC government or state owned state-owned enterprises. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 2. In my country, local municipalities or provinces have sister-city or sister-province ties (友好城市) with municipalities or provinces in the PRC. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 4. In my country, politicians or government employees at the local (non-national) level visit the PRC and have meetings meet with PRC officials and think tanks. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 6. In my country, there are reports of politicians or political parties receiving campaign finance or significant in-kind donations that originate in the PRC. from PRC-connected entities or individuals. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Changed 9. In my country, politicians or government employees have been pressured by publicly echoed PRC diplomats to change their talking points (e.g. denying PRC human rights issues, arguing that the PRC’s one-party political or diplomatic stances. system could be beneficial for my country’s economic growth). (0 = No; no; 1 = Few, few, but insignificant; 2 = More more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = Few, few, but significant; 4 = More more than a few, and significant)
Changed 11. In my country, politicians or government employees have publicly expressed positive views officials, political parties, and political elites try to suppress criticism of the PRC government. PRC. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Added 5. Representatives of a political party in my country’s national legislature have been invited to visit the PRC or attended events hosted by the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party (中共中央对外联络部), including World Political Parties Summits, CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meetings, BRICS Political Parties Dialogues, Think Tanks and Civil Society Organizations Fora, etc. (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Added 8. PRC officials or PRC state media have criticized, harassed, or threatened local politicians, local government officials, or political parties in my country due to their activities, statements or policy advocacy. (0 = No; 1 = Few, but insignificant; 2 = More than a few, but insignificant; 3 = Few, but significant; 4 = More than a few, and significant)
Removed
Removed 8. In my country, groups with reported links to the United Front Work Department (UFWD) have made public statements opposing the candidacy of a local political candidate or party, claiming them being “anti-China”. (0 = No; 1 = Few, but insignificant; 2 = More than a few, but insignificant; 3 = Few, but significant; 4 = More than a few, and significant)
Removed
Foreign Policy
Changed 1. My country’s legislature has a joint parliamentary friendship group, committee or other forms of sub-organizations with the PRC. YES/NO
Changed Additional remark on this Indicator: Although in some countries, parliamentary structure does not allow for such groups or committees, we still consider this Indicator as important. “Joint parliamentary friendship group” means joint as between the PRC and target country representatives.
Changed 2. In my country, celebrities regularly publish My country receives foreign aid or share propaganda narratives significant in-kind donations from the PRC. (0 = no; No; 1 = few, Few, but insignificant; 2 = more More than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, Few, but significant; 4 = more More than a few, and significant)
Changed 4. Citizens of my country have been detained in the PRC or denied exit visas, and believed to be suffering from unfair legal treatments for political reasons, a.k.a. “hostage diplomacy”. diplomacy.”) YES/NO
Changed 8. My government has shown support of supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC’s territorial claims (such as on the South China Sea arbitration ruling issued by the UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal in July 2016; 2016); except claims over Taiwan, which are indirectly covered in Indicator 6.) indicator 7. (0 = My country has rejected PRC’s claim; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has adhered to PRC’s claim.)
Changed 9. My country government has shown one of supported, remained silent about, or opposed the following stances on PRC’s treatment of its PRC’s treatment, governance, or policy towards the Uyghur population. population in Xinjiang. (0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance.)
Changed 10. My country government has shown one of supported, remained silent about, or opposed the following stances on PRC’s treatment of its PRC’s treatment, governance, or policy toward the Tibet population. (0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance.)
Changed 11. My government has not publicly criticized supported, remained silent about, or opposed the PRC’s PRC’s ongoing repression in Hong Kong, such as the imposition of the National Security Law on or other actions to persecute Hong Kong. Kong protestors or activists. (0 = My country has denounced PRC; 2 = My country has remained silent; 4 = My country has voiced support to PRC’s stance.)
Added 5. In my country, politicians or government officials participate in events or projects affiliated with the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED, 中国环境与发展国际合作委员会).YES/NO
Added 6. My country has signed an agreement with the PRC to classify their diplomatic relationship as a “Strategic Partnership” or beyond. [See Additional Remark] YES/NO
Added
Added 7. My country unquestionably uses PRC’s “One China Principle” which articulates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, rather than my country’s own “One China Policy.” [See Additional Remark] YES/NO
Added
Removed 6. The head of state, head of government or foreign minister of my country has denied Taiwan’s right to participation as a member, observer or guest in WHO. YES/NO
Removed
Removed 7. My country publicly supported the appointment of a PRC official to be the head of a United Nations agency (such as the FAO or ICAO) or other intergovernmental organizations (such as INTERPOL). (0 = no; 1 = few, but insignificant; 2 = more than a few, but insignificant; 3 = few, but significant; 4 = more than a few, and significant)
Glossary
General
Changed PRC-connected individuals and or entities – Actors undertaking activities under an arrangement with; in the service of; on the order or at the request of; or under the direction of the PRC government or party-state apparatus. For the purposes of the China Index, PRC corporations, enterprises, and state-owned enterprises all fall into this category.
Media
Changed State media, state-funded media, state-controlled media or state-owned media – Media for mass communication, including broadcast, digital and print outlets, that is under financial and editorial control of or is otherwise supported by the PRC government, directly or indirectly. For example, CGTN, Xinhua News, China Daily.
Changed Doubts about human Human rights abuses in the PRC – For example, a media personality who expresses doubts that there Restrictions are in place to prevent discussion of internment camps in Xinjiang; that suppression of ethnic minorities exists; that human rights defenders are subject to harassment, enforced disappearance and arbitrary detention; or that freedom of expression, association, and religious belief, (etc.) are restricted.
Foreign Policy
Added
Added
Added
Added
Added
Added
Removed
Removed
Removed
Academia
Added
Added
Removed
Domestic Politics
Changed PRC-affiliated or connected individuals or entities, networks/associations – Formal and informal groups or individuals of think tanks or academic institutions instigated by the PRC government to promote collaboration among their stakeholders.
Removed
Economy
Changed PRC-related or PRC-connected venture capital entities – Funds or individuals Entities that invest in start-up or early growth businesses undertake activities under an arrangement with the PRC, with; in the service of the PRC, of; on the order or at the request of the PRC, of; or under the direction of the PRC. PRC government or party-state apparatus.
Removed
Removed
Technology
Changed PRC-related or PRC-connected entities – Entities that undertake activities under an arrangement with; in the service of; on the order or at the request of; or under the direction of the PRC government or party-state apparatus.
Society
Changed Closely engaged entities – For example, communication between the two bodies is frequently conducted through established channels, and works to serve purposes such as facilitating personnel exchanges, work placements and internships, workshops, forums and speaker events, as well as advising/instructing on the content of events, materials, and memberships.
Changed Entertainment products and related hardware – For example, Cable/satellite cable/satellite channels hosting dramas, news and other TV shows, digital streaming movie and music platforms, computer/mobile game subscriptions; and the hardware required to transmit them (e.g. over-the-top streaming players hosting PRC media channels).
Added
Removed
Removed
Military
Changed Receiving Received direct or deferred benefits – For example, cash transfers, financial assets such as bonds and stocks, property, fully-funded trips to foreign countries, or appointments to lucrative positions as board members or consultants with PRC-connected companies and think tanks, including casinos, energy and telecoms companies, etc.